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I analyzed the effects of Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Revenue Protection crop
insurance (RP) on the RP coverage level by certainty equivalents and certainty equivalent
returns. ARC is a commodity program that falls under Title I of the 2014 farm bill and triggers a
payment for a participating producer once his actual revenue falls below a band of 76-86 percent
of a calculated expected revenue. RP is a revenue-based crop insurance program that allows for
a producer to sign up for one of eight different coverage levels ranging from 50-85 percent in 5
percent increments. This leads to the idea that in order to maximize his utility, a fully-informed,
expected-utility maximizing producer should not choose to select full coverage RP but rather
select the 75 percent RP and pair it with the ARC program. This analysis is conducted under the
conceptual frameworks of expected-utility and cumulative prospect theory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Agricultural Act of 2014, also known as the 2014 farm bill, repealed major farm
assistance programs from the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, including direct
payments (DP), counter-cyclical payments (CCP), and the Average Crop Revenue Election
Program (ACRE) (P.L. 113-79). The replacement programs were novel approaches for price,
yield, and revenue risk. These programs, found under Title I of the 2014 farm bill, include
Agriculture Risk Coverage at the county level (ARC-CO), Agricultural Risk Coverage at the
farm level (ARC-IC), and Price Loss Coverage (PLC).
A producer may choose to be covered by any of these programs, but once an election is
made, it remains in place for the life of the 2014 farm bill. These programs were renewed in the
2018 farm bill. The ARC-CO, which will hereon be referred to as ARC, program is on a
commodity-by-commodity basis, and producers can choose which commodities to put in ARC
and which commodities to put in PLC. Each of these programs are paid on historical base acres
which may differ from actual planted acres.
If a producer chooses to be covered by ARC, a payment is made if the county crop
revenue drops below 86 percent of the county benchmark revenue. ARC is offered in a coverage
range from 76-86 percent of the county benchmark revenue, which indicates its nature as a
“shallow loss” program, or a program with a smaller coverage range. The county benchmark
revenue is found by multiplying the five-year Olympic average of the county yield by the five1

year Olympic average of the national average price or the reference price, whichever price is
higher. The five-year Olympic average for yield is determined by using the previous five-year
county production yield history, dropping the highest and lowest yields, and averaging the
remaining three county yields. The same formula is used for determining the five-year Olympic
average price, except the marketing year average (MYA) price, is averaged. The MYA price is
an average of statewide average prices received by the farmer across the United States and is
determined by survey data collected by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS). To determine the payment for a covered commodity under ARC, payment equals the
difference between the per acre county benchmark revenue (guarantee), which is explained
above, and per acre actual revenue and multiply it by 85 percent of the base acres of the
commodity.
USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers several crop insurance programs,
but this research only focuses on Revenue Protection (RP). Crop insurance programs require
producers to purchase insurance policies at subsidized rates, whereas producers may participate
in commodity programs at no out-of-pocket cost to them.
RP provides protection against a farmer’s gross revenue dropping below a calculated
guaranteed revenue and, similar to ARC, it is used to mitigate yield and price risk. Guaranteed
revenue is determined by multiplying the elected coverage level by the actual production history
(APH) yield then multiplying the result by the higher of the base market price or the month-long
harvest price. The APH yield is a simple average farm yield calculated using four to ten years of
actual production. The base market price is an average of the harvest time futures price for a
month prior to planting, and the month-long harvest price is the harvest price for the last month
of the contract. RP pays an indemnity equal to the difference between the farmer’s actual
2

revenue (determined by multiplying the actual yield by the harvest market price) and the
guaranteed revenue.
A farmer can purchase crop insurance with a subsidized premium where different
coverage levels have a different producer paid premium (PPP). PPP increases as coverage level
increases due to increasing expected indemnities and decreasing percentage of subsidy (see
Table 1). The PPP is equal to the total premium minus the subsidy paid by the government. Crop
insurance programs are considered “deep loss” programs because coverage levels range from 50
percent-85 percent and cover all losses below that chosen coverage level (i.e. they cover all
losses between a complete loss up to the coverage level). The subsidy schedule below follows
that of both the basic and optional unit structures. Basic units consist of all of a farmer’s owned
and cash rented acres in the same county combined, but each crop is separate. Under optional
units, each farm and crop are separately insured (e.g. a farmer with four farms in a county each
has its own coverage).
Table 1

Traditional Crop Insurance Subsidy Schedule
Coverage Level (percent)
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85

Subsidy (percent)
67
64
64
59
59
55
48
38
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Figure 1

Visual Example of Intended Use of Revenue Programs in 2014 Farm Bill

This research focuses on ARC and RP because this combination has dominated the
choices of U.S. corn and soybean farmers since the 2014 Farm Bill’s enactment and because of
their unique relationship in the nature of their payment mechanism and overlapping coverage
bands (see Figure 2). Compared to all other available programs, the amount of ARC and RP
uptake dominates among corn and soybean farmers. According to USDA-FSA (2015),
producers of 94 percent of corn and soybean base acres opted for the ARC program, while,
according to USDA-RMA (2017), 92 percent of corn and soybeans acres enrolled in traditional
4

crop insurance programs (i.e. YP, RP, RP-HPE) were enrolled in RP. Figure 1 shows, visually,
the intended use of the revenue programs in the 2014 farm bill, which was to stack the shallow
loss ARC on top of the deep loss RP. Although the greatest percentage of farmers in the U.S. in
2017 chose 75% coverage, that is not the case in every region, namely Illinois and Mississippi.
According the RMA Summary of Business in 2017, in these two regions, 85% RP coverage
dominates coverage level selections for both Illinois and Mississippi, which introduces the
problem depicted below in Figure 2, the overlapping coverage levels between ARC and RP.

Figure 2

Overlap in Revenue Protection Crop Insurance and Agriculture Risk Coverage
5

Although the 2014 legislation did not prohibit the overlap, this phenomenon was not
openly the original intent. The stated intent for the 2014 farm bill commodity programs was to
introduce shallow loss commodity programs to stack on top of the deep loss crop insurance
programs. ARC is a shallow loss program, in that it has a relatively narrow, or shallow, coverage
band between 76-86 percent of the county benchmark revenue. RP is the deep loss program that
is designed to work in conjunction with ARC. The justification for allowing double coverage to
occur is that it provides protection while avoiding the moral hazard problem associated with
higher coverages (Orden and Zulauf, 2015). Although this may be true, it is still worth noting
that although an increase in coverage results in an increase in premium paid per acre, the
producer is paying more per acre for every coverage level below the selected coverage level all
the way down to a complete loss. For example, a producer switching from 75% to 80% coverage
will not only pay more for the 5% additional coverage, but he will also pay more on the coverage
levels below 80% all the way down to complete loss. This is a result of the producer’s shrinking
deductible, or co-pay, as well as the increase in the probability of the producer receiving an
indemnity. This research will address if it is necessary for a producer to select RP coverage
levels into the ARC coverage range, and more specifically, if it is necessary for a farmer to pay
for the additional premiums associated with an increase in coverage level.
It is evident that this purchasing of double coverage is regionally-specific (Figures 3 and
4). Essentially, the Corn Belt is contrasted with all other regions. What seems to be
counterintuitive is how farmers in the lower risk region of the Corn Belt are purchasing RP
coverage levels into the double-coverage range, while farmers in higher risk regions (e.g. the
Mississippi Delta) are not. This raises the question of why this behavior is regionally-specific.

6

This phenomenon has the potential to benefit farmers and the crop insurance industry, alike,
because farmers can be double-paid on the overlapped portion on the same acres while crop
insurance agents (and companies) receive compensation according to a fixed percentage of
premium, if base acres is equal to planted acres. Thus, producers purchasing higher coverage
earn the insurance industry greater commissions. However, preliminary analysis suggests that in
aggregate U.S. corn and soybean farmers are spending more than $1 billion per year for
producer-paid premiums, buying protection into the double coverage range. Furthermore, the
marginal premium (i.e. marginal cost) is greatest at coverage levels of 75 percent and above,
which include the 80 percent and 85 percent coverage levels that fall into the ARC coverage
range. This results in part from the declining subsidy percentage on higher coverages. Thus,
producers, opting for higher coverage, pay for the marginal coverage, but also pay more for all
coverage because of lower subsidy percentage on all layers of coverage. Note this marginal
analysis ignores the fact that most corn farmers opted for ARC protection already covering the
layer of risk in question.

7

Figure 3

2017 Percentage of Corn Acres Insured Above 75 percent RP Coverage Level

Note: The highest percentage of insured acres in the 80 percent and 85 percent coverage levels
are in the Midwestern states of Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana, while some of the lowest acres in this
category are in the Mississippi Delta region. This is assuming all of the acres enrolled in crop
insurance are also enrolled in ARC. Source: USDA RMA (2017)

8

Figure 4

2017 Percentage of Soybeans Acres Insured Above 75 percent RP Coverage Level

Note: The story doesn’t appear to change when the crop is changed from corn to soybeans.
Source: USDA RMA (2017)
Ultimately, this introduces the economic question of why a farmer would be willing to
pay to double-cover themselves in the shallow loss range, and if this is the optimal risk
management strategy.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is an extreme form of risk aversion. Another
explanation is that crop insurance agents are inducing farmers to buy crop insurance coverage
levels that are not in the farmers’ best interests. One question to consider is, could this imply
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possible adverse selection on the part of the insurance agent? That is, are producers less
informed of marginal cost and benefits of additional coverage than the agents advising them?
Our contribution to the literature is to determine the optimal coverage level of RP for a
producer given that the producer has already signed up for ARC. Simulation models of optimal
behavior under expected utility and prospect theory will allow investigation of how risk levels,
risk aversion, and other parameters affect optimal coverage levels given ARC is also being used
as a risk management tool. While recent literature has addressed ARC and crop insurance
(Cooper, Hungerford, and O’Donoghue, 2015), none has specifically addressed the prima facie
behavioral anomalies illustrated here. Since the crop insurance title was largely unchanged in the
2018 farm bill, this research could provide an analysis of the RP crop insurance program to help
aid in writing future legislation regarding farm policy tools. This research will also help
producers make more cost-effective decisions when deciding whether or not to purchase higher
coverage levels of crop insurance. Other agricultural economists studying optimal producer
behavior could be interested in the idea of a farmer choosing coverage levels where marginal
benefit is not greater than or equal to marginal cost. This topic is relevant to all American
consumers, producers, policymakers, and other members of the food production and marketing
chain.

10

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
2014 Farm Bill Overlap
There has been very little research on the overlap between programs in the 2014 farm bill
[Yehouenou et al. (2018); Cooper, Hungerford, and O’Donoghue (2015); Bulut and Collins
(2014)] and even fewer on ARC in general [Orden and Zulauf (2015)]. This could most likely be
due to the fact that the ARC program has only existed since 2014.
Bulut and Collins (2014) conducted research on designing farm supplemental revenue
coverage on top of crop insurance coverage, but this does not answer the question of the overlap
between the commodity program and crop insurance program. Rather, that paper focuses more
on the farmer choice of SCO and STAX, which are supplemental revenue options to crop
insurance programs. SCO, supplemental coverage option, can only be combined with PLC but
not ARC. STAX, stacked income protection, can be a stand-alone crop insurance coverage
option or supplemental coverage option to cotton only. Bulut and Collins (2014) study shallow
loss programs, rather than the interaction of deep and shallow loss programs. Bulut and Collins
(2014) mention the overlap in area plans and crop insurance, but it is dismissed as they claim that
area plans are only a limited substitute for risk protection with individual insurance plans due to
yield basis risk, which is the idiosyncratic differences in yields between each individual farm
yield relative to the county yield average Furthermore, they claim ARC payments and crop
insurance indemnities are not offset against one another and ARC is subject to payment limits,
while crop insurance has no limits.
11

Yehouenou et al. (2018) analyze the STAX program for cotton using certainty
equivalents. Their approach is similar to ours in the fact that they are analyzing optimal
coverage levels and program combinations among programs in the 2014 farm bill. The work
presented by Yehouenou et al. (2018) focus on determining the optimal coverage level of STAX
paired with RP, which are both crop insurance programs, for producers in Texas. They find that
a standalone STAX program would not be a very effective to farm-level crop insurance, but
suggest that cotton producers in Texas would benefit more from using STAX as a complement to
their farm-level crop insurance (e.g. RP).
Cooper et al. (2015) conducted similar research but answer different questions with room
for exploration. Cooper et al. (2015) study the interactions of shallow loss support programs
(e.g. ARC) and traditional federal crop insurance programs (e.g. RP). In their research, it is
assumed that the producer already has acres enrolled in 75 percent coverage RP, and they are
making the decision to sign up for ARC or SCO, both found under Title I in the 2014 farm bill.
My work, in essence, does the opposite. I assume the producer has already enrolled in
ARC for the duration of the 2014 farm bill and is locked into that program. The producer’s
decision now is to sign up for a traditional crop insurance program and decide which level of
coverage to buy. Cooper et al. (2015) simulate revenue payments per acre with different farm
program election combinations, rather than explore differing levels of RP coverage to find the
optimal level of coverage paired with ARC.
Crop Insurance Demand
Considering crop insurance demand, Coble et al. (2000) studied forward contracting
demand by incorporating a substitute for hedging and subsidized crop insurance. In their work,
12

they argue that because revenue insurance products control for yield and price risk, it is relevant
to consider what implications subsidized insurance products have on producer forward
contracting demand. They also address what effect hedging has on demand for crop insurance,
since hedging is considered a substitute for crop insurance. In their analysis, they followed an
expected utility framework and created a model that maximizes expected utility with the choice
variable being the quantity of production hedge given that the producer is already insured. Our
work plans to investigate the optimal level of RP given that the producer has already signed up
for ARC.
Du et al. (2016) present research that focuses on inconsistencies between crop insurance
markets and economic theory. They are more concerned with how farmers’ choices for differing
crop insurance programs and coverage levels, given differing premium subsidies, will conform to
economic theory in an experimental setting. Their paper had two motivations which were to
investigate the validity of an income transfer maximization claim and to shed light on the role of
government subsidies and insurance premiums in insurance product choices. They compared the
results of an experiment of farmers’ crop insurance coverage level choices and compared them to
the expected utility framework to see if a farmer’s actual choice conformed to that theoretical
framework. They found that farmers did not conform to expected utility theory, and in fact,
chose coverage levels below full coverage, which was contrary to their expected outcome. This
thesis also explores crop insurance demand by replicating producer behavior for low-risk and
high-risk farms and determining how inclusion of complimentary farm programs affects the
optimal level of crop insurance for a producer.

13

Overlap in the 2008 Farm Bill
Although there is currently little relevant research on the 2014 farm bill relating to this
research, there has been much work done on the potential for overlap in the 2008 Farm Bill
[Heerman, et al. (2016); Bulut et al. (2012); O’Donoghue (2011); Cooper (2010); and Zulauf,
Schnitkey, and Langemeier (2010)]. Bulut et al. (2012) conducted research on optimal coverage
level choices for individual and area crop insurance plans under the proposals for the 2014 Farm
Bill. Their paper focuses on 2008 Farm Bill programs such as ACRE (Average Crop Revenue
Election), SURE (Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments), GRP (Group Risk Plan) and
GRIP (Group Risk Income Protection). Bulut et al. (2012) examine the interaction between crop
insurance and other farm support programs and are more concerned with how producers will
react to farm policy proposals, rather than what has already been enacted into public law.
Cooper and O’Donoghue (2011) also explore whether or not receiving benefits from
multiple programs affects farmers’ business decisions by analyzing the overlap between 2008
Farm Bill crop insurance (SURE) and commodity (ACRE) programs. This research addresses
what Cooper and O’Donoghue (2011) defines as Type I overlap, or where an overlap in multiple
programs produces benefits beyond intended levels of individual programs. Cooper and
O’Donoghue (2011) also defines the potential for a Type II overlap to occur in future farm bill
debates. Cooper and O’Donoghue (2011) defines Type II overlap as overlap that leads to
benefits within intended levels of the programs but exceed levels necessary to meet farm safety
net goals in terms of farm business viability. In other words, Type II overlap occurs when
producers begin to earn enough money through government assistance that it is a relatively large
portion of farm revenue and is considered more of a revenue stream rather than farm safety net
assistance. An example of Type I overlap in the 2014 farm bill is when a farmer decides to
14

choose the higher levels of RP (e.g. 80-85 percent) to add to their ARC coverage and receives
benefits beyond ARC alone or benefits beyond RP alone. An example of Type II is when a
farmer decides to sign up for ARC and RP and receives payments within the intended levels but
is a relatively large portion of their total on-farm income.
Pre-Subsidy Wedges
Wang et al. (2003) describe the base premium rate wedge as a premium that is not
actuarially fair because of factors such as asymmetric information and imperfect risk
classification. Wang et al. (2003) suggest that RMA and other crop insurance providers
recognize the existence of pre-subsidy wedges and their large variation across farmers. The
wedge is a ratio that indicates how much lower or higher a premium rate is perceived to be by
the farmer than the base premium rate determined by RMA. In other words, from a producer’s
perspective, it is the discrepancy between what the producer thinks to be the actuarially fair rate
(AFR) versus what RMA thinks to be the AFR. For this work, it is simply a means of sensitivity
analysis. The derivation of the wedge has been explored in Wang et al. (2003), but for this work
it is a ratio multiplied by the premium. A wedge greater than 1.0 would indicate that the farmer
thinks the AFR is higher than what the farmer believes it to be, and a wedge less than 1.0 would
indicate that the farmer thinks the AFR is lower than what the farmer believes it to be.
Empirically, a wedge greater than 1.0 will drive down the AFR, and a wedge less than 1.0 will
drive up the AFR. Wang et al. (2003) even suggest that if the pre-subsidy wedge is high enough,
a regressive subsidy schedule (like the one faced by a decision-maker choosing RP crop
insurance) can have the effect of shifting the producer toward a more efficient coverage level in
terms of risk mitigation. I plan to pursue the effects of a wedge further, like others [Du et al.
(2016), Deng et al. (2007), Barnett et al. (2005), and Black and Hu (2002)], in this work.
15

Cumulative Prospect Theory
Although Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has been used in risk analysis for numerous
research projects, there have been many critics of EUT. To begin with, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) provide a critique of, as well as an alternative to, expected utility theory in their original
paper. The main idea behind prospect theory is people underweight outcomes that are unlikely
in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. They deem this the certainty
effect, where the decision maker tends to be risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) list what they consider to be five major phenomena of choice:
framing effects, nonlinear preferences, source dependence, risk seeking, and loss aversion. The
framing effects phenomena is a violation of rational choice theory, which states that equivalent
formulations of a choice problem should result in the same preference order. Tversky and
Kahneman (1986) find that there is evidence in the framing of options that yield thoroughly
different preferences. Nonlinear preferences relate to the shape of outcome probabilities. For
example, outcome probabilities under constant relative risk aversion in EUT follows a straight
line. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) argue that outcome probabilities follow a cubic, nonlinear,
shape using experimental evidence. Source dependence is the idea that a person would be more
comfortable taking on a gamble in an area where they are not only more familiar but more
competent. For example, Ellsberg (1961) found that people would prefer to take a gamble on an
urn that containing equal numbers of red and green balls, rather than red and green balls in
unknown proportions. An example in agriculture could be that a farmer would choose the
gamble, or source of uncertainty, that he or she is most competent in, such as growing corn over
rice, if they are better practiced in rice production. Another phenomenon of choice is the idea
that a decision-maker is risk seeking in the domain of losses. Risk seeking is more prevalent
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when people must choose between two losses. The last violation of rational choice Tversky and
Khaneman (1992) address is that of loss aversion, or the idea that losses loom larger over gains
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). The loss domain is not
considered in EUT.
To consider the domains in which gains and losses occur, another component of prospect
theory called a reference point must be established. In their original paper, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) conduct experiments where decision-makers choose between two prospects, or
gambles, with given values and probabilities specifically assigned to each prospect. The
reference point is defined to be each decision-maker’s current assets, or the status quo, but what
if a person is faced with another prospect that could result in a gain or loss from a different
amount of wealth? This is where EUT fails to formulate a decision problem in terms of gains
and losses, as people usually do, and instead formulates a decision problem in terms of final
assets (Kahneman and Tverksy, 1979).
Tverksy and Kahneman (1992) critique their previous work by introducing the concept of
a cumulative functional for the probability distribution used in the probability weighting
function. The weighting scheme first introduced runs into two problems. First of all, the
weighting scheme does not always meet the conditions for stochastic dominance. Second, it is
not freely extended to prospects with many outcomes. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) define the
cumulative functional by arranging the outcomes of each prospect in increasing order.
In addition to introducing the cumulative functional for the probability weighting
function, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) introduce a piecewise value function, where the value is
considered a gain if the outcome is greater than or equal to zero and a loss if the outcome is less
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than zero. The functional forms of these two components of cumulative prospect theory (CPT)
will be discussed in further detail in Chapter III.
The more notable works in the agricultural economics literature using prospect theory are
by Babcock (2015) and Bulut (2016), which provides room for further exploration in studying
producer behavior under the CPT framework. Babcock (2015) is the first paper in the
agricultural economics literature to use CPT as a framework to analyze optimal decision-making
for a producer.
Babcock (2015) models CPT like Tversky and Kahneman (1992) by using the piecewise
value function and cumulative probability weighting functions as discussed earlier. The
motivation for his work is to explain anomalous producer behavior, such as suboptimal risk
management decision using RP crop insurance. Babcock (2015) compares three different
representative farms under the CPT framework: a corn farm from York County, Nebraska, a
wheat field from Sumner County, Kansas, and a cotton farm from Lubbock county, Texas. In
contrast, my work considers two different locations planting the same crops for comparison
across regions. Babcock (2015) uses a stochastic simulation of revenues but makes an
assumption of a uniform revenue distribution, where each revenue has a probability of 1/ N
occurring. I will discuss the discrepancy between this assumption and the simulated revenues in
this work in Chapter III. Babcock (2015), then converts the weighted average value function to
certainty equivalent returns, so as to make the results from the CPT framework more comparable
with those of the EUT framework.
Bulut (2016) does an extension of Babcock (2015) by comparing the two different
frameworks. In fact, Bulut (2016) addresses the suboptimal decision-making of producers under
EUT by taking a closer look at CPT as an alternative framework to explain why producers would
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choose 85 percent RP coverage paired with a new supplemental crop insurance program (e.g.
SCO or STAX). Bulut (2016) uses the same methods as Babcock (2015) by simulating a
revenue distribution to use for calculating premiums and indemnities. Bulut (2016) considers the
same reference points as Babcock (2015) where the difference between the expected indemnity
and paid premium, where a scenario when expected indemnity is less than the paid premium
would result in a loss and vice-versa. However, this claim assumes the farmer does not care
about the deductible. In order to address this unrealistic assumption, Bulut (2016) uses the
expected crop value (ECV) as a more appropriate reference point.
This work plans to take the same approach as the previous two works done in agricultural
economics. In an effort to explain the suboptimal behavior of double coverage, I will use EUT
as the base framework of comparison, and through sensitivity analysis will compared the results
of the CPT framework to those of the EUT framework. However, this work will address a
discrepancy in Babcock (2015) of the uniform revenue distribution, as well as study the overlap
between RP and ARC, rather than RP and other area insurance plans as in Bulut (2016).
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter contains an explanation of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and its
application used in this work. The axioms of EUT are laid out, followed by which variables,
conceptually, are included in the utility and certainty equivalent calculations. This chapter also
includes a discussion of the CPT model and which reference points are considered and why.
Expected Utility Theory
The EUT model considers a decision-maker’s ability to cope with risk and uncertainty.
EUT was introduced in 1944 by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s “Theory of Game and
Behavior” in an attempt to explain an individual’s selection behavior. Further, Robinson and
Berry (1987) claim that there are two main components of decision theory – risk attitude and risk
perception. The model will take into account these components by forming an equation to
represent decision-maker utility. This equation will be the sum of varying monetary outcomes
times a probabilistic weight to represent the likelihood of each occurrence.
Each individual has his/her own unique utility function and their risk attitude will depend
on the shape of their utility function. Individuals are usually grouped into three different sets.
These three groups consist of risk averse, risk neutral, and risk loving individuals.
A risk neutral individual will have a strictly linear utility function where the expected
utility is equal to the utility of the expected value of some level of wealth and the second
derivative of the utility function is equal to zero. A risk loving individual will have a convex
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utility function where the expected utility is greater than the utility of the expected value of some
level of wealth and the second derivative of the utility function is greater than zero. The most
common and thoroughly discussed individual is the risk averse individual. A risk averse
individual will have a concave utility function where the expected utility is less than the utility of
the expected value of some level of wealth and the second the derivative of the utility function is
less than zero.
Mathematically, levels of risk aversion can be expressed with a relationship between
wealth and utility. According to Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (2015) when more is preferred
to less, the following explains risk attitudes:

U ' (W )  0

(1)

where U (W ) is utility as a function of wealth, W and U ' () denotes the first derivative.
Equation (1) shows that the first derivative of the utility function is increasing. Although this
may be true for some individuals, to determine the shape of the function, one must consider the
second derivative of the utility function.

U "(W )  0

(2)

U "(W ) = 0

(3)

U "(W )  0

(4)

Equation (2) represents a risk loving individual; equation (3) represents a risk neutral
individual; and equation (4) represents a risk averse individual.
Furthermore, Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson (2015) show that through the use of the
Arrow-Pratt coefficient, or the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, an individual’s level of risk
aversion can be established. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient is:
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RA (W ) = −

U " (W )
U ' (W )

(5)

Under this framework, I assume a risk-averse individual as the base case scenario. The
model represents a risk averse producer choosing the optimal level of RP coverage to buy where
the choice variable is the coverage level. One hypothesis is that a risk averse producer will
choose to double cover their crop, whereas a risk loving producer will choose not to double
cover their crop.
Assuming the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of behavior, the producer maximizes
his expected utility. The utility function is strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously
differentiable, which is assuming the shape of a risk averse rather than risk neutral individual.
ARC and RP Under Expected Utility Theory
In terms of farm commodity and crop insurance programs, I am considering only ARC
and RP crop insurance for irrigated corn. In order to predict optimal producer behavior based on
utility maximization, the utility function must be broken down into equations for average crop
revenues, RP indemnities, RP producer paid premiums, and ARC payments.
Average crop revenues can be found by the following equation:

R = Pc Yf − C

(6)

where R is the stochastic average crop revenue per planted acre, Pc is the marginal change
stochastic cash price received, Y f is the stochastic farm-level yield, and C are variable costs of
production.
RP indemnities are calculated using the equation below:
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(

(

)

)

I = MAX   MAX Fs , Ff  Yg − Ff Yf  ,0
 


(7)

where I is the RP indemnity per planted acre, Fs is the spring futures price, Ff is the stochastic
futures price in the fall, Yg is the APH yield, and  is the RP coverage level chosen by the
producer.
RP producer paid premiums can be found with the following equation:

M =   Fs Yg  A ( )  (1 − S ( ))  

(8)

where M is the RP producer paid premium per planted acre, A ( ) is the actuarially fair base
premium rate which is a function of the coverage level, S ( ) is the subsidy as a function of
coverage level, and  is a pre-subsidy wedge.
ARC payments are calculated using the equation below:

(

)

C
ARC = ( 0.85 ) AB MIN  MAX  ZP0Y0C − PM YC , 0  , 0.1PY
0 0



where ARC is the total amount of ARC payment for a farm, AB is the number of base acres
C
selected for a given commodity, P0 is the Olympic average price, Y0 is the Olympic average

county yield, PM is the stochastic MYA price, YC is the stochastic county yield, and Z is the
ARC payment rate1.

1

The ARC payment rate is set at 86 percent by federal law (P.L. 113-79).
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(9)

In order to simulate a producer making a decision to choose the optimal coverage level
percentage of RP crop insurance, the above components (Equations 6-9) must be incorporated
into an equation that forms the objective utility function below:

E (U ) = MAX


     U  A ( R + I − M ) + ARC  f ( P , P
p

c

M

)

, Ff , Y f , YC dPc dPM dFf dY f dYC (10)

Pc PM F f Y f YC

where Ap is the total planted acres for a given farm, and f () is the joint marginal probability
distribution of prices and yields.
Producers are assumed to maximize a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function:

U=

W 1−
1−

(11)

where   1 is the risk aversion parameter, which is set initially at  = 2 .
For each scenario, the certainty equivalent (CE) calculated is given by:
1

CE = (1 −  ) E (U )1−

(12)

It is important to understand that the certainty equivalent is the dollar amount that would
render the producer indifferent between receiving the dollar amount with certainty or taking the
gamble. The larger the certainty equivalent, the more optimal the RP coverage level and ARC
combination will be. Results were generated for scenarios with different combinations of RP
coverage levels, premium structures (i.e. actuarially fair or subsidized), the inclusion of ARC
payments, and the degree of CRRA risk aversion.
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Comparative Statics of the Producer Paid Premium
Preliminary analysis of the marginal premium is something else to consider in this
research question concerning the higher coverage levels. In order to focus on the producer paid
per acre premium and its relationship with the coverage level, consider the first derivative of
equation (8) with respect to coverage level below:
M
A
S
= E ( R )  A ( )  (1 − S ( ) )   +   E ( R ) 
 (1 − S ( ) )   +   E ( R )  A ( ) −





(13)

where E ( R ) is the expected value of the crop, which is a product of the spring futures price and
APH yield.

level, and

A
is the partial derivative of the actuarially fair rate with respect to the coverage


S
is the partial derivative of the premium subsidy with respect to the coverage


level.
In equations (14) through (16), the total effect of coverage level on the producer paid
premium as given by equation (13) is broken down into three components: the effect of the
coverage level through liability ( M _ Liab ) , the effect of the coverage level through the
actuarially fair rate ( M _ A ) , and the effect of the coverage level through the subsidized rate

(M ).
 _S

M _ Liab = E ( R )  A( )  (1 − S ( ))    0
M _ A =   E ( R )

A
A
1 − S ( ) )    0,
0
(
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(14)
(15)

M  _ S =   E ( R ) A ( ) −

S
S
   0,
0



(16)

Since all three of these components are greater than zero, the relationship between the
producer paid premium and coverage level must be positive. That is to say as the coverage level
increases, so does the producer paid per acre premium. I will conduct analysis of this using data
from RMA’s Cost Estimator in the next chapter to determine what the implications of this have
on a producer’s optimal coverage level.
ARC and RP Under Cumulative Prospect Theory
Under Tverksy and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT), a decisionmaker values a risky prospect, or gamble, than can take on m + n discrete values, xi , each with
an assigned probability, pi , as the weighted average value of each xi :

V=

n

 v ( x ) ( p )
i

i =− m

i

(17)

where  ( pi ) translates a probability into a decision weight. To follow the cumulative
functional, the xi values are sorted from smallest to largest with m values being negative losses
and

n

values being positive gains. The key point to make is that these are changes in income or

wealth from an initial reference point, not levels of income or wealth.
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) conduct experiments and introduce a value function,

v ( x ) , to best explain the experimental data, where v ( x ) is concave in gains and convex in
losses (see Figure 5).
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Another key aspect of CPT is the probability weighting function, which is used to
calculate a decision weight for each gain and loss. I will denote the weighting function for gains
+
−
as w ( ) and the weighting function over losses as w ( ) , where

 is a cumulative

probability.

The decision weight for any gain i is:

 i+ = w+ ( pi + ... + pn ) − w+ ( pi+1 + ... + pn ) ;  n+ = w+ ( pn )

(18)

The decision weight for any loss i is:

 i− = w− ( pi + ... + pm ) − w− ( pi+1 + ... + pm ) ;  m− = w− ( pm )

Figure 5

Value Function Under Prospect Theory
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(19)

Note: The value function under CPT considers the gains and losses domains, whereas the EUT
framework only considers the domain of gains.
As discussed earlier, the reference point distinguishing gains from losses merits some
careful thought and consideration. For this work, I will use the same reference points as used by
Babcock (2015), as well as include a reference point that represents a scenario where the farmer
signs up for RP insurance and ARC. They are given below:

R1 = E ( R ) + p ( ) (1 − s ( )) ; xi = Py
i i + I − R1

(20)

R2 = E ( R ) ; xi = Py
i i + Ii − R2

(21)

R3 = p ( ) (1 − s ( )) ; xi = Ii − R3

(22)

R4 = E ( R) + p ( ) (1 − s ( )) + ARC; xi = Py
i i + Ii + ARC − R4

(23)

where E ( R ) is the expected value of crop revenue, p ( ) is the unsubsidized premium as a
function of coverage level,  , and s ( ) is the amount of subsidy given by the federal
government, or USDA’s share of the premium as a function of coverage level. The first
reference point, R1 , is given by equation (20) and includes per-acre expected revenue plus a peracre farmer-paid (subsidized) premium. The second reference point, R2 , is given by equation
(21) and includes only per-acre expected revenue. The third reference point, R3 , is given by
equation (22) and includes only the per-acre farmer-paid premium. The fourth reference
point, R4 , given by equation (23), is the reference point that models a farmer choosing to
double-cover themselves and will be used to compare between EUT and CPT frameworks.
In order to arrive at the optimal level of crop insurance coverage to buy,  , under CPT, it
must be the coverage level that maximizes equation (17). Empirical analysis can be used to
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arrive at the optimal coverage level, but then one must conduct sensitivity analysis on the
different parameters in the piecewise value function and probability weighting functions to gain
intuition about and see what is driving the results. The piecewise value function is given as:
 x a
v ( x) = 
a
− ( − x )

if x  0 

if x  0 

(24)

where x is a monetary gain or loss,  determines the degree of loss aversion, and a determines
the shape (curvature) of the value function for gains and losses. In order to place the prospect
values in monetary terms, equation (24) must inverted to arrive at what Babcock (2015)
considers to be certainty equivalent returns (CER). The equation for the CER calculation is
given below:

v1/ a
if v  0


1/ a
x (v) =   v 

if v  0 
−  − 
  


(25)

In following Babcock (2015), I will initially set a = 0.88 and  = 2.25 , which is also
what Tversky and Kahneman (1992) use for the initial values of the loss aversion and shape
parameters of the value function.
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the probability weighting functions are
given as:

w+ (  ) =

(



)

 1/ 

 + (1 −  )

and
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(26)

w− (  ) =

(



)

 1/

 + (1 −  )

(27)

where  is the cumulative probability. Through analysis of experimental data, Kahneman and
Tversky find parameter values for these functions and set them at  = 0.61 and  = 0.69 .
Babcock (2015) goes on to assume that each Monte Carlo draw of revenue and the
resulting indemnity are equally likely to occur. The revenue distribution found from the
stochastic simulation does not follow a distribution that corresponds to Babcock’s (2015)
assumption. This discrepancy in probability distributions will be considered in another work as
an extension of this thesis.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODS
Price and Yield Stochastic Simulation
The yields used in this simulation come from 25 years of irrigated county yield data from
RMA. The price data used come from twenty-five years of December corn futures prices from
the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB), as well as state cash prices received and the national
Marketing Year Average (MYA) prices calculated by the National Agriculture Statistics Service
(NASS). Yields and prices were simulated using a technique known as the Phoon, Quek, and
Huang (PQH) procedure, as described by Phoon, Quek, and Huang (2004). Anderson, Harri, and
Coble’s (2009) step-by-step explanation on how to simulate k random correlated variables using
the PQH procedure is given in five steps.
a. Convert rank correlation matrix of prices and yields, S , to Pearson correlation, ρ ,
using
ρ = 2sin ( / 6 ) S 

(29)

b. Compute eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the Pearson correlation and confirm that
it is nonnegative definite (i.e. the minimum eigenvalue is equal to or greater than zero).
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c. Use these eigen solutions from the correlation matrix of prices and yields to derive the
correlated standard normal,  k , by using a Karhunen-Loeve (KL) expansion. Below is
an equation that gives the KL expansion of a Gaussian process,  k :

k =   k k ( ) f k ( )

(28)

k

where  k and f k ( ) are eigenvalues and eigenvectors, respectively, of the covariance
function of prices and yields.  k ( ) is a vector of randomly generated independent
standard normal variables as used in Phoon, Huang, and Quek (2002).
d. Determine the probability associated with each of the correlated standard normal
deviates by transformation of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each
stochastic variable of prices and yields.
Step (d) results in a vector of probability values that are correlated according to the rank
correlation of prices and yields used at the beginning of the procedure. The final step of the
PQH procedure is:
e. Convert correlated probabilities from step (d) into simulated outcomes, in this case
prices and yields, by inverse transformation of the desired marginal distribution.
For this work, yields were simulated using a beta distribution, as presented by Nelson and
Preckel (1989) as a distribution appropriate to model yield risk. Prices were simulated using a
lognormal distribution, since lognormality has become widely accepted standards for
representing and model price risk and because prices often exhibit behavior consistent with
lognormality (Goodwin and Ker, 2002).
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Farm Yield Calculations
NASS county yield data for the time period 1992-2017 were used to estimate a linear
trend, which was used to detrend farm-level yields for each farm in a given county. The linear
trend was found using the following equation:
Yc =  0 + 1t + 

(31)

where Yc is the yield for county c ,  0 is an intercept,  1 is the linear trend coefficient, t is the
time in years, and  is an error term. Using the linear trend found in equation (31), detrended
farm-level yields were calculated using the equation below:
Yit = Yc + 1 (2018 − t ) + i

(32)

where Yit is the yield for farm i in year t , and  i is the idiosyncratic yield risk. As
explained by Miranda (1991),  is a random number generated from a standard normal
distribution centered around mean zero with a standard deviation that varied from farm to farm.
The standard deviation is the driver for the base premium rate calculation needed to calculate the
producer paid premium and represents the amount of risk simulated by a representative farm
yield that is different from the county yield. The larger the standard deviation is the riskier the
farm is perceived to be, which in turn results in higher base premium rates. Table 2 gives the
standard deviations used for the idiosyncratic risk in each location and crop. The correlation
matrices used in the PQH procedure for corn in both locations are given in Tables 3 and 4, while
the correlation matrices for soybeans in both locations are given in Tables 5 and 6. Summary

33

statistics for county and farm yields, as well as the MYA, harvest, and cash prices2 for corn and
soybeans in both locations are given in Table 7.
Table 2

Standard Deviations Used For Idiosyncratic Yield Risk Term
Illinois
Mississippi

Corn
25
79

Soybeans
11
23

The correlation matrices used in the PQH procedure for corn in both locations are given
in Tables 2 and 3, while the correlation matrices for soybeans in both locations are given in
Tables 4 and 5. Summary statistics for county and farm yields, as well as the MYA, harvest, and
cash prices3 for corn and soybeans in both locations are given in Table 6.
Base Premium Rate Calculations
Base premium rates for Revenue Protection (RP) crop insurance were calculated using
the simulated yields and prices. There are two values needed in order to calculate a base
premium rate for a given coverage level: total liability and the expected indemnity. The
calculations required to arrive at a base premium rate for a given coverage level are given below.
Total liability for a given coverage level is found using the formula below:

L =   YAPH  FBeg

(33)

where L is the total liability, Y is the mean farm APH yield, and F is the December corn
futures price at planting time, or the beginning futures price.

For this analysis, we consider the marginal prices for all prices. That is, what the price changes were from year to
year for the cash price received, the harvest (i.e. December futures) price, and the national MYA price.
3
For this analysis, we consider the marginal prices for all prices. That is, what the price changes were from year to
year for the cash price received, the harvest (i.e. December futures) price, and the national MYA price.
2
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The revenue guarantee is calculated using the formula below:
G =   YAPH  PHarvest

(34)

where G is the revenue guarantee, and P is the average harvest cash price received in a
given state.

The revenue guarantee is then used to calculate an indemnity, which is found by using the
formula below:

I = MAX 0, G − RMkt 

(35)

Where I is the indemnity, and RMkt is the market revenue for a given farm.
Finally, the base premium rate for a given coverage level is calculated using the
following formula:
RPBase _ Rt =

E (I )
L

Where RPBase _ Rt is the base premium rate, and E ( I ) is the expected value of the
indemnity, which is the average of per acre indemnities.
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Table 3

Yc

McLean Co., IL Corn Rank Correlation Matrix
Yc

Yf

Pc

Ff

PM

1

0.65

-0.39

0.49

0.51

1

-0.24

0.22

0.24

1

-0.11

-0.05

1

0.98

Yf
Pc

Ff

1

PM

Table 4

Yc

Yf

Bolivar Co., MS Corn Rank Correlation Matrix
Yc

Yf

Pc

Ff

PM

1

0.14

-0.21

0.00

-0.34

1

-0.23

0.04

-0.15

1

0.15

0.50

1

0.33

Pc

Ff

1

PM
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Table 5

Yc

McLean Co., IL Soybean Rank Correlation Matrix
Yc

Yf

Pc

Ff

PM

1

0.38

-0.33

0.12

0.11

1

-0.15

-0.05

-0.05

1

-0.01

-0.12

1

0.98

Yf
Pc

Ff

1

PM

Table 6

Yc

Yf

Bolivar Co., MS Soybean Rank Correlation Matrix
Yc

Yf

Pc

Ff

PM

1

0.28

-0.05

-0.03

0.18

1

0.01

-0.02

0.19

1

-0.74

-0.14

1

0.49

Pc

Ff

1

PM
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Table 7

Summary Statistics of the Data Used for Simulation of Prices and Yields

Region and
Crop

McLean Co., IL Corn

Bolivar Co., MS Corn

McLean Co., IL
Soybeans

Bolivar Co., MS
Soybeans

County Yield

Mean (s.d.)
[Min., Max.]

224.37 (14.64)
[188.86, 255.04]

179.00 (13.99)
[151.35, 214.95]

63.68 (4.40)
[47.12, 68.66]

54.59 (4.16)
[46.60, 63.06]

Farm Yield

Mean (s.d.)
[Min., Max.]

223.72 (24.89)
[148.16, 280.94]

180.94 (78.76)
[0, 392.74]

62.65 (11.06)
[26.92, 92.92]

55.33 (23.42)
[0, 115.43]

 Cash Price

Mean (s.d.)
[Min., Max.]

0.05 (0.77)
[-2.35, 1.71]

0.09 (0.84)
[-1.81, 7.11]

0.17 (1.41)
[-3.00, 3.72]

0.16 (1.13)
[-2.20, 2.50]

Mean (s.d.)
[Min., Max.]

-0.04 (0.21)
[-0.63, 0.51]

-0.10 (0.66)
[-1.27, 1.82]

0.18 (0.45)
[-1.33, 0.98]

0.00 (0.64)
[-1.43, 1.35]

Mean (s.d.)
[Min., Max.]

-0.08 (0.22)
[-0.61, 0.62]

0.05 (0.79)
[-2.43, 1.63]

-0.01 (0.44)
[-1.53, 0.75]

-0.01 (0.45)
[-1.53, 0.75]

 Harvest
Price
 MYA Price
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Table 8

Simulated RP Base Premium Rates by Coverage Level

McLean Co., IL
Corn
Bolivar Co., MS
Corn
McLean Co., IL
Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS
Soybeans

50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
percent percent percent percent percent percent percent percent
0.0021

0.0039

0.0068

0.0110

0.0170

0.0249

0.0350

0.0477

0.0556

0.0690

0.0837

0.0998

0.1171

0.1354

0.1546

0.1745

0.0005

0.0013

0.0029

0.0059

0.0187

0.0185

0.0291

0.0431

0.0436

0.0545

0.0667

0.0800

0.9436

0.1097

0.1260

0.1431

Simulated base premium rates for each location and crop are given in Table 8 above.
These rates were simulated to reflect the rates given by the RMA Cost Estimator and are
calibrated at the 75 percent RP coverage level. There is a significant difference in premium rates
between the two locations under consideration. The rates follow the idea that farms in Illinois
are less risky and have lower premium rates relative to farms in Mississippi. The large variance
(i.e. more risk) in the Mississippi county and farm yields is the main driver behind the relatively
higher rates compared to Illinois. These higher premium rates could explain the low uptake in
higher levels of RP insurance in the Mississippi Delta, while the lower premium rates in Illinois
could explain the greater uptake in higher coverage levels, as mentioned in Chapter I (see Figure
3).
Farm program parameters and on-farm costs that were hard-coded into the model are
given in Table 9. The Olympic Average (OA) prices and yields required for the ARC payment
guarantee are given, as well as a ratio of base to planted acres. On-farm per acre costs, as well as
beginning futures prices for corn and soybeans for both locations, are also given. The OA yield
was calculated from the data used for the simulation of yields used to create the revenue
distribution. I took the last five years of farm yields calculated from the RMA county yield using
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an additive idiosyncratic risk term, dropped the highest and lowest yields, then averaged the
remaining three. The OA prices were also calculated from the data used for the simulated
revenues and were calculated by taking the last five years of cash prices received (i.e. countylevel MYA price), dropping the highest and lowest prices, and averaging the remaining three
prices. The loan rates are set by USDA. The beginning futures prices used were chosen based
on USDA RMA’s price election amount in the liability calculation in the Cost Estimator. The
on-farm costs per acre for McLean County, Illinois were taken from the 2018 crop budgets
published by FarmDoc Daily. The on-farm costs per acre for Bolivar County, Mississippi were
taken from the 2018 Mississippi State University Crop Irrigation Budgets published by the
Mississippi State University Extension Service.
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Table 9

ARC Program and Farm Parameters
ARC Program and Farm Parameters
ARC (Corn)
Olympic Average Yield
Olympic Average Price
Loan Rate
Base Acres/Planted Acres
ARC (Soybeans)
Olympic Average Yield
Olympic Average Price
Loan Rate
Base Acres/Planted Acres
Beginning Futures Price
Corn
Soybeans

McLean Co., IL

Bolivar Co., MS

231.00
$3.56
$1.95
1.00

179.00
$3.56
$1.95
1.00

66.00
$9.86
$5.00
1.00

55.00
$10.23
$5.00
1.00

$3.96
$10.16

$3.91
$10.04

On-Farm Costs per Acre
Corn
$692.48
$570.00
Soybeans
$472.35
$345.00
Source: Olympic Average Yields were calculated using USDA RMA data from 2013-2017, and
Olympic Average Prices were calculated using cash prices received from USDA NASS data
from 2013-2017. Beginning futures prices were the same as the price election amount used in
the RMA Cost Estimator, and ARC Loan rates were taken from USDA Farm Service Agency
(FSA). On-farm costs for Illinois came from the University of Illinois Extension Service’s 2018
Crop Budget through FarmDoc Daily, while on-farm costs for Mississippi come from the
Mississippi State University’s 2018 Crop Budgets.

41

Initial Wealth
One critical component of EUT is the initial wealth parameter. For the McLean County,
Illinois farm, an initial wealth of $3815.00 per acre was used and is the per acre net worth of
Illinois farms enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management survey (Schnitkey,
2018). Arriving at an initial wealth for Bolivar County, Mississippi was not as simple because
there is no up-to-date data on farm wealth or farm net worth for Mississippi. To arrive at an
initial wealth value for this representative farm, I assume that farm wealth is proportional to land
values (see equation 37).

=




(37)

where  is a percentage of per acre net worth,  , divided by the current per acre land
value,  . After finding  for Illinois, I multiplied it by the per acre land value in Mississippi to
arrive at the initial wealth for the representative farm from Bolivar County, Mississippi, which is
simply a manipulation of equation (37).

 =  

(38)

According to the August 2017 USDA NASS Summary of Land Values, average land
values for Illinois were $7,300 per acre. According to the 2018 Survey of Lenders given by the
Mississippi Extension Service, average land sales for the Delta region of Mississippi for 2017
were $4,453.00 per acre. With  for the Illinois farm found to be equal to 52 percent, this
results in the initial wealth for the Bolivar County, Mississippi farm to be $2,468.00.
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Description of Methods Used in CPT
This section describes the methods used under the CPT framework in Babcock (2015), as
well as the motivation for consideration of alternatives to Babcock (2015). The price and yield
data used for the derivation of the revenue distribution were simulated by use of the Monte Carlo
method mentioned earlier, the PQH procedure. Babcock (2015) does not assume any closed
form solution for the distribution of revenues.
Reference points and actual values ( xi ) were calculated from the simulated revenue
distribution, which has no closed form. Let F ( R ) be the CDF of revenue to be insured by crop
insurance and covered by ARC. The xi will simply be random draws of revenue from F ( R ) ,
N will be the total number of simulated draws, and Rref will be denoted as the reference point.
n will be the number of gains, that is, when xi  Rref , and m will be the number of losses, that

is, when xi  Rref . According to Babock (2015), by definition the probability of any of the N
draws is

1
, where each Monte Carlo draw of revenue, as well as the resulting indemnity, are
N

equally likely to occur. Thus, the probability that a gain will be greater than the smallest
probable gain is given by

n −1
. Furthermore, the probability of a gain that is equal to or greater
N

than the smallest gain is considered as

n
. Therefore, following equation (18), the decision
N

+ n 
+  n −1 
weight for the smallest gain possible is w   − w 
 . In the same way, the decision
N
 N 
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+  n −1 
+n−2
weight assigned to the second smallest gain is w 
−w 
 . The decision weight
 N 
 N 
+ 1 
given to the greatest gain would be w   .
N

Similarly, for losses, the decision weight for the smallest loss, following equation (19), is

m
 m −1 
w−   − w− 
 , and the decision weight for the next smallest loss is
N
 N 
 m −1 
− m−2
− 1 
w− 
−w 
 . The decision weight for the greatest loss is w   .
 N 
 N 
N
The per acre value of farming in a given year for each representative producer is found by
converting 100,000 revenue draws from the simulated revenue distribution into 100,000 gains
and losses. The calculation of gains and losses is straightforward, where the reference point is

( )

subtracted from each draw of revenue ( xi ) . A CDF for each corresponding gain w+ , equation

( )

(18), and loss w− , equation (19), was derived by sorting the gains from the smallest to largest,
as well as sorting the losses from smallest to largest. Total value (V ) , as depicted by equation
(16), is calculated by summing the total value of gains and the total value of losses. Gains and
losses are calculated similarly. For example, the total value of gains is determined by calculating
the value of each loss by equation (24), then multiplying this value by the decision weight
calculated by equations (18) and then summing over all gains.
Under CPT, Babcock (2015) converts the total value (V ) to a certainty equivalent return
(CER), so I do the same. CERs are, conceptually, the same as CEs in the idea that a CER is the
dollar amount that makes a decision maker indifferent between two choices. Under EUT, CEs
represent a dollar amount making the decision maker indifferent between taking a certain amount
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of money, or facing a gamble, while under CPT, CERs represent a decision maker indifferent
between taking a certain amount of money, or facing the risk of the gain or loss. I take the
inverse of each V to arrive at CERs for each reference point, and the corresponding coverage
levels under each reference point. These CERs are compared across coverage levels under each
reference point. CERs are not compared across reference points due to the inconsistent nature of
each reference point (i.e. the reference points are not the same).
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
The results section is structured into five subsections. To begin, I discuss an empirical
illustration of the comparative statics mentioned in Chapter III using RMA cost estimator data.
That is followed up by two sections detailing descriptive statistics for RP premiums and
indemnities, as well as descriptive statistics for the alternative revenue scenarios (i.e. differing
combinations of ARC and the eight RP coverage levels). The results section ends with a
discussion of optimal risk management strategies under EUT, as well as a comparison between
risk management strategies under EUT and CPT.
Illustration of Comparative Statics Using RMA Cost Estimator Data
Although a producer receives a subsidized premium rate at every coverage level, the
producer paid per acre premium also increases as the coverage level increases. This was
demonstrated in Chapter III when taking a look at the comparative statics of the producer paid
premium’s relationship to the coverage level. The partial derivative of producer paid premium
with respect to coverage level is greater than zero, indicating that there is a positive relationship
between the two variables. The three components of the partial derivative were also considered,
that is the effect of the coverage level through liability, the effect of the coverage level through
the actuarially fair rate, and the effect of the coverage level through the subsidized rate. Figures
6-9 show what happens to the producer paid per acre premium as the components are added
together. In figures 6 and 8, the representative Illinois corn and soybean farms, the slope of the
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producer paid premium line increases sharply at the higher coverage levels of 75-85 percent.
This would indicate that, at the overlapping coverage levels, the marginal premium is the
greatest. Not only will the producers pay for 5 percent marginally increase in coverage, but they
will also pay more on average on all of their previous coverage. This is much more prevalent in
the Illinois cases relative to the Mississippi cases.
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RP Producer Paid per acre Premium Breakdown for McLean County, Illinois Corn

Note: M L _ Liab , depicted by Prem_1, is the effect on premium of coverage through liability.

M L _ Liab + M L _ A , depicted by Prem_2, is the addition of the actuarially fair base premium rate.
M L _ Liab + M L _ A + M L _ S , depicted by Prem_3, is the addition of all of the components of the
producer paid per acre premium, with M L _ S representing the subsidized premium rate.
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Descriptive Statistics for Premiums and Indemnities
Tables 10-13 show mean indemnities per acre at all eight coverage levels were above
their respective coverage level’s mean premium paid per acre. In Tables 10 and 12, the highest
mean net indemnity is found under 85 percent RP crop insurance, which would indicate that for a
producer focusing only on crop insurance subsidy, they would maximize their return by selecting
85 percent crop insurance. The story is not the same in Tables 11 and 13, where the average net
indemnities are greatest at the 80 percent RP coverage level. Corn and soybeans both exhibit the
greatest average net indemnities at 85 percent RP in Illinois and 80 percent in Mississippi.
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Table 10

Descriptive Statistics for McLean Co., IL Corn Program Variables

Variable
Per Acre Premium @ 50 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 55 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 60 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 65 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 70 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 75 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 80 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 85 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 50 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 55 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 60 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 65 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 70 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 75 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 80 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 85 percent
Net Indemnity @ 50 percent
Net Indemnity @ 55 percent
Net Indemnity @ 60 percent
Net Indemnity @ 65 percent
Net Indemnity @ 70 percent
Net Indemnity @ 75 percent
Net Indemnity @ 80 percent
Net Indemnity @ 85 percent

Mean
0.32
0.71
1.33
2.65
4.37
7.50
12.95
22.29
0.96
1.97
3.70
6.47
10.66
16.67
24.91
35.95
0.65
1.26
2.37
3.82
6.29
9.17
11.96
13.66

S.D.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
9.86
14.84
21.33
29.47
39.29
50.75
63.69
77.84
9.86
14.84
21.33
29.47
39.29
50.75
63.69
77.84
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Min.
0.32
0.71
1.33
2.65
4.37
7.50
12.95
22.29
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.32
-0.71
-1.33
-2.65
-4.37
-7.50
-12.95
-22.29

Max.
0.32
0.71
1.33
2.65
4.37
7.50
12.95
22.29
351.24
395.53
439.83
484.12
528.42
572.72
617.01
661.31
350.92
394.82
438.50
481.47
524.05
565.22
604.06
639.02

Table 11

Descriptive Statistics for Bolivar Co., MS Corn Program Variables

Variable
Per Acre Premium @ 50 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 55 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 60 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 65 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 70 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 75 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 80 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 85 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 50 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 55 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 60 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 65 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 70 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 75 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 80 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 85 percent
Net Indemnity @ 50 percent
Net Indemnity @ 55 percent
Net Indemnity @ 60 percent
Net Indemnity @ 65 percent
Net Indemnity @ 70 percent
Net Indemnity @ 75 percent
Net Indemnity @ 80 percent
Net Indemnity @ 85 percent

Mean
6.34
9.48
12.60
18.56
23.48
31.97
45.04
64.51
19.21
26.35
34.99
45.27
57.27
71.04
86.62
104.05
12.87
16.86
22.40
26.71
33.79
39.07
41.58
39.54
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S.D.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
58.09
70.40
83.56
97.42
111.81
126.59
141.59
156.64
58.09
70.40
83.56
97.42
111.81
126.59
141.59
156.64

Min.
6.34
9.48
12.60
18.56
23.48
31.97
45.04
64.51
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-6.34
-9.48
-12.60
-18.56
-23.48
-31.97
-45.04
-64.51

Max.
6.34
9.48
12.60
18.56
23.48
31.97
45.04
64.51
541.94
601.77
661.60
723.83
790.62
857.42
924.21
991.00
535.60
592.28
649.00
705.27
767.14
825.45
879.17
926.49

Table 12

Descriptive Statistics for McLean Co., IL Soybean Program Variables

Variable
Per Acre Premium @ 50 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 55 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 60 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 65 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 70 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 75 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 80 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 85 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 50 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 55 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 60 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 65 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 70 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 75 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 80 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 85 percent
Net Indemnity @ 50 percent
Net Indemnity @ 55 percent
Net Indemnity @ 60 percent
Net Indemnity @ 65 percent
Net Indemnity @ 70 percent
Net Indemnity @ 75 percent
Net Indemnity @ 80 percent
Net Indemnity @ 85 percent

Mean
0.05
0.16
0.40
1.00
1.99
3.96
7.70
14.45
0.15
0.44
1.10
2.43
4.84
8.81
14.81
23.31
0.10
0.28
0.71
1.43
2.86
4.85
7.11
8.86
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S.D.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.77
5.02
8.43
13.23
19.63
27.64
37.14
47.83
2.77
5.02
8.43
13.23
19.63
27.64
37.14
47.83

Min.
0.05
0.16
0.40
1.00
1.99
3.96
7.70
14.45
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.05
-0.16
-0.40
-1.00
-1.99
-3.96
-7.70
-14.45

Max.
0.05
0.16
0.40
1.00
1.99
3.96
7.70
14.45
158.66
190.49
222.32
254.14
285.97
317.80
349.62
381.45
158.61
190.33
221.92
253.15
283.98
313.83
341.92
366.99

Table 13

Descriptive Statistics for Bolivar Co., MS Soybean Program Variables

Variable
Per Acre Premium @ 50 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 55 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 60 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 65 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 70 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 75 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 80 percent
Per Acre Premium @ 85 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 50 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 55 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 60 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 65 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 70 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 75 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 80 percent
Per Acre Indemnity @ 85 percent
Net Indemnity @ 50 percent
Net Indemnity @ 55 percent
Net Indemnity @ 60 percent
Net Indemnity @ 65 percent
Net Indemnity @ 70 percent
Net Indemnity @ 75 percent
Net Indemnity @ 80 percent
Net Indemnity @ 85 percent

Mean
4.05
6.08
8.12
12.02
15.28
20.89
29.58
42.57
12.26
16.90
22.56
29.32
37.26
46.43
56.88
68.67
8.22
10.81
14.44
17.30
21.98
25.54
27.30
26.09
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S.D.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
39.82
48.49
57.84
67.77
78.17
88.95
99.98
111.15
39.82
48.49
57.84
67.77
78.17
88.95
99.98
111.15

Min.
4.05
6.08
8.12
12.02
15.28
20.89
29.58
42.57
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-4.05
-6.08
-8.12
-12.02
-15.28
-20.89
-29.58
-42.57

Max.
4.05
6.08
8.12
12.02
15.28
20.89
29.58
42.57
385.20
425.79
466.37
506.96
547.55
588.14
628.72
669.31
381.15
419.70
458.25
494.94
532.27
567.24
599.14
626.74

Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Revenue Scenarios
Tables 14-17 show the descriptive statistics for per acre on-farm revenues and different
combinations of RP insurance and ARC. Each table shows revenues for the scenario without
insurance and without or with ARC payments, revenues for the different RP coverage levels with
and without an ARC payment, as well as a scenario of ARC payments with no insurance. For
McLean County, Illinois corn, the greatest average revenues occur at the scenario where a
producer elects to sign up for 85 percent RP and ARC (see Table 14). For Bolivar County,
Mississippi corn, the greatest average revenues occur at 80 percent RP paired with ARC, and the
average ARC payment is $14.59 (see Table 15). In the case of soybeans, the greatest average
revenues occur at the same scenarios as corn, that is 85 percent for McLean County, Illinois (see
Table 16) and 80 percent for Bolivar County, Mississippi (see Table 17). The average ARC
payments for representative corn farms from McLean County, Illinois and Bolivar County,
Mississippi are near the same at $14.77 per acre and $14.59 per acre, respectively. The average
ARC payments for the representative soybean farms in McLean County, Illinois and Bolivar
County, MS are less than half, or more, of the ARC payments for corn at $7.06 and $4.54,
respectively.
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Table 14

Descriptive Statistics for McLean Co., IL Corn Revenues and ARC Payments

Variable
No Insurance, No ARC
50 percent RP Only
55 percent RP Only
60 percent RP Only
65 percent RP Only
70 percent RP Only
75 percent RP Only
80 percent RP Only
85 percent RP Only
No Insurance + ARC
50 percent RP + ARC
55 percent RP + ARC
60 percent RP + ARC
65 percent RP + ARC
70 percent RP + ARC
75 percent RP + ARC
80 percent RP + ARC
85 percent RP + ARC
ARC Payment

Mean
337.49
338.14
338.75
339.86
341.31
343.78
346.66
349.45
351.15
352.26
352.91
353.52
354.63
356.08
358.55
361.43
364.22
365.92
14.77
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S.D.
242.84
240.78
238.93
236.02
231.79
226.00
218.50
209.24
198.21
221.62
220.35
219.17
217.25
214.37
210.23
204.61
197.30
188.15
41.70

Min.
-478.27
-127.35
-83.45
-39.77
3.20
45.78
86.95
125.79
160.75
-191.53
-64.61
-53.17
-39.77
3.20
45.78
86.95
125.79
160.75
0.00

Max.
1519.42
1519.10
1518.71
1518.09
1516.77
1515.05
1511.92
1506.47
1497.13
1519.42
1519.10
1518.71
1518.09
1516.77
1515.05
1511.92
1506.47
1497.13
305.89

Table 15

Descriptive Statistics for Bolivar Co., MS Corn Revenues and ARC Payments

Variable
No Insurance, No ARC
50 percent RP Only
55 percent RP Only
60 percent RP Only
65 percent RP Only
70 percent RP Only
75 percent RP Only
80 percent RP Only
85 percent RP Only
No Insurance + ARC
50 percent RP + ARC
55 percent RP + ARC
60 percent RP + ARC
65 percent RP + ARC
70 percent RP + ARC
75 percent RP + ARC
80 percent RP + ARC
85 percent RP + ARC
ARC Payment

Mean
7.91679
20.788
24.7776
30.312
34.6232
41.7048
46.9877
49.4931
47.4564
22.508
35.3792
39.3688
44.9032
49.2144
56.296
61.5789
64.0843
62.0476
14.5912
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S.D.
302.029
276.425
268.884
260.476
251.316
241.532
231.324
220.872
210.379
292.394
267.025
259.584
251.302
242.295
232.695
222.698
212.483
202.249
39.4786

Min.
-679.45
-345.08
-312.85
-280.59
-251.18
-220.73
-193.84
-171.54
-155.64
-676.61
-345.08
-312.85
-280.59
-251.18
-220.73
-193.84
-171.54
-155.64
0.00

Max.
1570.63
1564.29
1561.15
1558.03
1552.07
1547.15
1538.66
1525.59
1506.12
1570.63
1564.29
1561.15
1558.03
1552.07
1547.15
1538.66
1525.59
1506.12
239.795

Table 16

Descriptive Statistics for McLean Co., IL Soybean Revenues and ARC Payments

Variable
No Insurance, No ARC
50 percent RP Only
55 percent RP Only
60 percent RP Only
65 percent RP Only
70 percent RP Only
75 percent RP Only
80 percent RP Only
85 percent RP Only
No Insurance + ARC
50 percent RP + ARC
55 percent RP + ARC
60 percent RP + ARC
65 percent RP + ARC
70 percent RP + ARC
75 percent RP + ARC
80 percent RP + ARC
85 percent RP + ARC
ARC Payment

Mean
304.21
304.31
304.49
304.91
305.64
307.06
309.05
311.32
313.07
311.27
311.37
311.55
311.97
312.70
314.12
316.11
318.38
320.13
7.06
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S.D.
153.02
152.66
152.07
150.85
148.68
145.19
140.15
133.55
125.55
143.71
143.47
143.04
142.12
140.38
137.46
133.11
127.26
120.03
21.43

Min.
-185.40
-26.79
4.93
36.52
67.74
98.58
128.43
156.52
181.59
-26.28
-9.22
4.93
36.52
67.74
98.58
128.43
156.52
181.59
0.00

Max.
1021.07
1021.02
1020.91
1020.67
1020.08
1019.09
1017.11
1013.37
1006.62
1021.07
1021.02
1020.91
1020.67
1020.08
1019.09
1017.11
1013.37
1006.62
248.35

Table 17

Descriptive Statistics for Bolivar Co., MS Soybean Revenues and ARC Payments

Variable
No Insurance, No ARC
50 percent RP Only
55 percent RP Only
60 percent RP Only
65 percent RP Only
70 percent RP Only
75 percent RP Only
80 percent RP Only
85 percent RP Only
No Insurance + ARC
50 percent RP + ARC
55 percent RP + ARC
60 percent RP + ARC
65 percent RP + ARC
70 percent RP + ARC
75 percent RP + ARC
85 percent RP + ARC
85 percent RP + ARC
ARC Payment

Mean
89.84
98.05
100.65
104.28
107.14
111.82
115.38
117.14
115.93
94.38
102.59
105.19
108.81
111.67
116.36
119.91
121.68
120.47
4.54
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S.D.
227.44
209.03
203.34
196.88
189.70
181.87
173.49
164.65
155.46
225.67
207.20
201.49
195.01
187.81
179.97
171.56
162.70
153.49
14.47

Min.
-460.13
-195.32
-169.25
-143.18
-118.97
-94.12
-71.63
-52.21
-37.09
-460.13
-195.32
-169.25
-143.18
-118.97
-94.12
-71.63
-52.21
-37.09
0.00

Max.
977.52
973.48
971.44
969.40
965.50
962.25
956.63
947.94
934.95
977.52
973.48
971.44
969.40
965.50
962.25
956.63
947.94
934.95
166.19

Optimal Risk Management Strategies Under EUT
Four different scenarios were considered in determining the optimal RP coverage level
for a given producer and crop. The first scenario (S1) consists of market revenues and
unsubsidized RP crop insurance and is the base case scenario for comparison. Scenario two (S2)
consists of market revenues and subsidized RP crop insurance and shows the effect of adding
subsidy to crop insurance. Scenario three (S3) includes market revenues, RP insurance, and
ARC payments and is the scenario that reveals the optimal coverage level under the assumption
that the producer has signed up for ARC and is making a decision on which coverage level to
sign up for. Finally, scenario four (S4) reveals the effects of the pre-subsidy wedge on the
optimal coverage level.
Figure 10-13 depict graphically, and Tables 18-21 depict numerically, for a
representative corn farm from McLean County, Illinois, the optimal coverage level is 85 percent
under all scenarios, except scenario four. Taking notice of the change from S1 to S2, after the
inclusion of the RP subsidy, the slope of the plotted certainty equivalents (CE) increased over all
coverage levels and increased the greatest at the higher coverage levels. This may be reflective
of the comparative statics, and relationship between the producer paid premium, discussed
earlier. However, the optimal coverage level remains at 85 percent. The change from S2 to S3
reflects what happens once ARC payments are included in the revenues and is depicted by a
parallel shift of the plotted CEs by the amount of ARC payment per acre. The optimal coverage
level under S3 remains at 85 percent, which is contrary to the hypothesis that a producer would
choose to sign up for a 75 percent RP coverage level with ARC. S4, the scenario containing the
wedge, is designed to model a farmer who would choose a 75 percent RP coverage level. The
wedge required to create this outcome is 1.70.
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For a representative corn farm from Bolivar County, Mississippi, the optimal coverage
level under S1 is 85 percent, while the inclusion of the RP subsidy drops the optimal coverage
level down from 85 percent to 80 percent in S2. Under S3, the plotted CEs follow that of S2 in
regards to the optimal coverage level of 80 percent but with a parallel shift of the line by an
amount that resembles that of the ARC payment. With the inclusion of the wedge, S4 reveals that
a wedge of 1.35 is required to push the optimal coverage level down to 75 percent. Again, this
reveals that a producer of representative farm from Bolivar County, Mississippi believes the
premium rates to be higher than they should be by 35 percent.
When the selected crop is switched from corn to soybeans, the overall story doesn’t
appear to change for Illinois or Mississippi. The optimal coverage level is still at 85 percent for
all scenarios in McLean County, Illinois, except S4, where the required wedge to drive down the
optimal coverage level to 75 percent is 1.75. In Bolivar County, Mississippi, the optimal
coverage level under S1 is still 85 percent; under S2 is 80 percent; under S3 is 80 percent; and
the required wedge to arrive at an optimal choice of 75 percent RP coverage is still 1.35.
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Figure 10

McLean Co., IL Corn Certainty Equivalents

Figure 11

Bolivar Co., MS Corn Certainty Equivalents
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Figure 12

McLean Co., IL Soybean Certainty Equivalents

Figure 13

Bolivar Co., MS Corn Certainty Equivalents
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Table 18

Certainty Equivalents for Scenario 1

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS Soybeans

Table 19

No
Insurance
$325.02
-$29.23
$297.78
$69.07

50
percent
$325.29
-$22.22
$297.81
$72.72

55
percent
$325.53
-$20.48
$297.86
$73.70

60
percent
$325.88
-$18.65
$297.96
$74.75

65
percent
$326.38
-$16.76
$298.13
$75.87

70
percent
$327.05
-$14.87
$298.39
$77.02

75
percent
$327.88
-$13.00
$298.75
$78.18

80
percent
$328.85
-$11.20
$299.20
$79.33

85
percent
$329.95
-$9.51
$299.71
$80.44

55
percent
$325.51
-$3.25
$297.80
$84.47

60
percent
$326.96
$4.21
$298.34
$89.18

65
percent
$328.90
$10.45
$299.27
$93.17

70
percent
$332.04
$19.53
$300.97
$99.04

75
percent
$335.79
$26.73
$303.33
$103.77

80
percent
$339.61
$31.00
$306.06
$106.68

85
percent
$342.45
$30.54
$308.34
$106.55

Certainty Equivalents for Scenario 2

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS Soybeans

No
Insurance
$323.75
-$29.35
$297.43
$68.85

50
percent
$324.67
-$9.02
$297.56
$80.88
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Table 20

Certainty Equivalents for Scenario 3

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS Soybeans

Table 21

No
Insurance
$341.11
-$12.24
$305.34
$73.76

50
percent
$341.89
$7.75
$305.46
$85.76

55
percent
$342.62
$13.43
$305.68
$89.34

60
percent
$343.90
$20.78
$306.19
$94.04

65
percent
$345.64
$26.91
$307.07
$98.02

70
percent
$348.53
$35.87
$308.71
$103.88

75
percent
$352.00
$42.94
$311.00
$108.60

80
percent
$355.55
$47.09
$313.66
$111.49

85
percent
$358.14
$46.52
$315.87
$111.35

80
percent
$345.11
$32.23
$309.06
$101.80

85
percent
$341.11
$24.86
$306.21
$97.07

Certainty Equivalents for Scenario 4

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS Soybeans

No
Insurance
$339.76
-$10.70
$306.67
$74.46

50
percent
$340.37
$6.71
$306.74
$85.04

55
percent
$340.82
$11.24
$306.87
$87.91

60
percent
$341.68
$17.43
$307.18
$91.90
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65
percent
$342.48
$21.43
$307.57
$94.52

70
percent
$344.14
$28.60
$308.43
$99.23

75
percent
$345.40
$32.66
$309.21
$101.96

Optimal Risk Management Strategies Under CPT
Recall that reference point 1 ( R1 ) consists of expected revenue and the subsidized
premium, where the realized value

( xi ) is made up of the sum of market revenue and

indemnities received. This reference point reflects most closely the scenarios under EUT.
Reference point 2 ( R2 ) consists of expected revenues only, where the realized value is
comprised of market revenues and indemnities. Reference point 3 ( R3 ) only takes into account
the producer paid subsidized premium, where the realized value consists of indemnities.
Reference point 4 ( R4 ) considers a farmer who signs up for RP insurance and ARC and will be
the reference point used as a means of comparison between EUT and CPT.
Conceptually similar to, but not the same as, certainty equivalents under EUT, certainty
equivalent returns (CER) are considered as a means of comparison. CERs are found by simply
inverting the value function are the dollar amounts that would render the decision-maker
indifferent between taking on the prospect, or the risk of the gain or loss, and accepting the dollar
amount with certainty and avoiding the prospect of a gain or loss. The optimal coverage level
will be the one with the highest CER under a given reference point.
Figures 14-21 depict graphically, while Tables 22-25 show numerically, the outcomes
under CPT. Under R1 , the optimal coverage level for both crops in both locations is 85 percent,
even though the magnitudes of CERs vary a great deal between the two locations and two crops
considered. The key difference is that a producer appears to be willing to accept nearly half as
much when they devote their crop entirely to soybeans versus corn in both locations, while the
Mississippi scenarios were the only ones to show CERs greater than zero (e.g. >65% under the
corn scenario and >70% in the soybean scenario).
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Under R2 , the only RP coverage levels with returns greater than zero are at the 80
percent and 85 percent RP coverage levels for Bolivar County, Mississippi corn. R2 only
considers the expected value of the crop, with the realized value consisting of the market revenue
and RP indemnity. To look into the value of subsidized RP further, I will consider the outcomes
under R3 . R3 gave outcomes that were entirely different than both R1 and R2 . Remember, R3
considers only the subsidized premium, so this is representative of a farmer who is most likely
maximizing subsidy. Babcock (2015) considers this reference point as a farmer playing a lottery
and not considering insurance as a tool for risk management. This could fall back in line with
the idea of overlap as a revenue stream rather than as a tool for risk management. Under R3 , the
optimal coverage level for a McLean County, Illinois farm is 60 percent, while a soybean farmer
in the same location would choose 65 percent RP. Considering Bolivar County, Mississippi, a
corn and soybean farmer would choose 50 percent RP. The results under R3 appear to be a total
inverse of the results under R1 , which could be a strong indicator of the subsidy included in RP
insurance, since R3 isolates the premium portion of. R4 is the scenario depicting the farmer’s
consideration of overlapping revenue insurance with ARC, where the optimal coverage level is
85 percent in all four locations and in both corn and soybeans. This result is still contrary to the
expected hypothesis of 75 percent RP being the optimal choice. However, reconsideration of the
probability distribution used under CPT could yield different results.
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Figure 14

Corn Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 1

Figure 15

Soybean Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 1
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Figure 16

Corn Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 2

Figure 17

Soybean Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 2
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Figure 18

Corn Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 3

Figure 19

Soybean Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 3
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Bolivar Co., MS

Soybean Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 4
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85%

Table 22

Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 1

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS Soybeans

Table 23

50
percent
-$44.32
-$27.59
-$29.04
-$27.38

55
percent
-$42.09
-$20.40
-$28.18
-$22.31

60
percent
-$38.93
-$12.65
-$26.70
-$16.68

65
percent
-$34.65
-$4.85
-$24.32
-$10.58

70
percent
-$29.13
$4.48
-$20.88
-$4.21

75
percent
-$22.30
$24.90
-$16.22
$3.62

80
percent
-$14.20
$49.01
-$10.33
$21.61

85
percent
-$5.05
$75.47
-$3.47
$42.48

65
percent
-$36.07
-$13.31
-$24.86
-$16.53

70
percent
-$31.44
-$7.01
-$21.94
-$11.32

75
percent
-$26.20
-$2.37
-$18.31
-$6.82

80
percent
-$20.77
$0.39
-$14.28
-$3.44

85
percent
-$15.82
$2.19
-$10.47
-$1.75

Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 2

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL
Bolivar Co., MS

50
percent
-$44.51
-$30.94
-$29.07
-$29.54

55
percent
-$42.49
-$25.28
-$28.27
-$25.49

60
percent
-$39.65
-$18.84
-$26.91
-$20.83
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Table 24

Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 3

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL Soybeans
Bolivar Co., MS Soybeans

Table 25

50
percent
$1.04
$3.53
$0.32
$2.09

55
percent
$1.23
$2.60
$0.55
$1.43

60
percent
$1.32
$2.80
$0.81
$1.38

65
percent
$0.74
$0.60
$0.83
-$0.05

70
percent
$0.39
$0.53
$0.79
-$0.14

75
percent
-$0.33
-$0.51
$0.25
-$0.87

80
percent
-$1.52
-$2.64
-$0.50
-$2.60

85
percent
-$3.87
-$6.58
-$1.96
-$5.65

65
percent
-$22.79
-$9.93
-$18.99
-$16.18

70
percent
-$18.02
-$3.68
-$16.07
-$10.98

75
percent
-$13.46
$0.91
-$12.58
-$6.48

80
percent
-$9.48
$7.68
-$8.88
-$3.10

85
percent
-$6.13
$9.51
-$5.67
-$1.39

Certainty Equivalent Returns Under Reference Point 4

McLean Co., IL Corn
Bolivar Co., MS Corn
McLean Co., IL
Bolivar Co., MS

50
percent
-$31.53
-$27.45
-$23.31
-$29.18

55
percent
-$29.43
-$21.84
-$22.49
-$25.13

60
percent
-$26.50
-$15.42
-$21.09
-$20.48
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Crop insurance and commodity programs are a novel approach to risk management for a
farmer. In order to create a way for these two to work in conjunction with one another, deep loss
crop insurance and shallow loss commodity programs were created in the 2014 farm bill and
have continued on into the 2018 farm bill. Although the idea appeared to be one that could be
effective, to stack shallow loss ARC on top of deep loss RP, opportunities for inefficiencies
occurred. $2.2 billion of 2017 corn and soybean insurance liability overlapping with ARC cost
producers over $1 billion. Farmers may have done this because they thought ARC would not
cover them, so they signed up for RP to increase their chances of receiving a payment. The
county-farm yield correlation may have been less than perfect and farm yields may not have
been as high as county yields, so ARC may not have been the best option as a standalone risk
management tool. Overall, this research aims to answer the question of what the optimal
coverage level of RP is paired with ARC.
Results indicate that it is optimal for a producer to double cover themselves, rather than
stack ARC on top of RP at the 75 percent coverage level. Regardless of the location being
considered here, the results show that a farmer should double cover themselves, or select an RP
coverage level that is in the ARC coverage band of 76-86 percent. In McLean County, Illinois,
85 percent RP paired with ARC is the optimal combination, while 80 percent RP paired with
ARC is the optimal combination for a farmer in Bolivar County, Mississippi.
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Sensitivity analysis was conducted on parameters such as the risk aversion, county-farm
yield correlation coefficient, county yield and cash price correlation coefficient, farm yield and
cash price correlation coefficient, as well as the initial wealth. However, this did not alter the
results and the optimal coverage level remained at 85 percent for McLean County, Illinois and 80
percent for Bolivar County, Mississippi.
This is, indeed, contrary to the stated hypothesis, but still introduces more interesting
avenues of discussion. Of course, one of the most popular questions in the literature and among
risk researchers is if the RMA rating calculation is an accurate depiction of each farmer’s
individual risk level. This is where the wedge helps to shed light on that question. The wedge is
helpful in determining if the simulated RP rates from RMA’s cost estimator are too high or too
low when being considered by a farmer making a decision to buy insurance. As the results
show, the wedge for both locations and both crops are greater than 1.0 leading to the initial
conclusion that farmers believe they are less risky than what RMA believes them to be and that
the rates are higher than what farmers would expect. One avenue of research to consider is the
estimation of the wedge and way to estimate the wedge. This could open up discussion for rating
methods and ways to improve the ratings.
Another point of discussion should be which framework to use in evaluating and
assessing risk for a farmer. This work, like Bulut (2016), compares EUT and CPT, but the
results seemed to stay relatively the same. In the case of R3 , where the effect of the RP subsidy
is isolated, the results were vastly different, but still tell a similar story of how farmers may just
be trying to maximize subsidy and possibly use crop insurance as a revenue stream rather than as
a risk management tool. The reference isolating the RP subsidy does not consider anything else
other than the premium and indemnity, which most likely is not a very accurate representation of
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what a farmer considers when making a decision to buy insurance, or not. The reference point
considering the case when a farmer signs up for both RP and ARC, includes expected revenues,
expected ARC payments, and the subsidized RP premiums. It is the CPT reference point ( R4 )
by which I compare results across frameworks. However, the results remained the same, and 85
percent is the optimal choice under CPT, as well as under EUT.
One extension of CPT in this work is to consider different reference points and to decide
what the most accurate reference points are. One could consider adding ARC payments to the
reference point, as well as other forms of income such as any off-farm income, or even hedges in
the commodity futures market. One could also consider conducting sensitivity analysis on the
shape parameter ( a ) and the loss aversion parameter (  ) to see if altering those parameters
would change the outcomes under CPT.
Finally, a worthwhile extension of CPT from this work would be to consider the
probability distribution used for the probability weighting function used to calculate decision
weights. Babcock (2015) assumes that each revenue will have the same draw of 1/N, which
would lead one to believe he assumes a uniform revenue distribution. This does not seem like an
accurate way to model a revenue distribution, so if one could attempt to fit different probability
distribution function to the simulated revenue distribution and use that distribution to calculate
decision weights and see if that alters the results of the CPT framework.
Another extension of this research would be to look at this from a behavioral standpoint.
This research began with the question of why farmers in relatively low-risk regions are buying
up into the 80 percent and 85 percent coverage levels, as well as why farmers in relatively highrisk regions are not buying crop insurance into this coverage range. At first glance, it appears
counterintuitive, so why would farmers be behaving this way? Is it the county-farm correlation
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being imperfect? Is it due to a farmer’s lack of trust in ARC, or could it even be due to the fact
that a farmer may not be very well informed and educated on how crop insurance works so they
are afraid to buy it? What if this is a question of behavior on the part of the crop insurance
agent?
While this research aimed to see if farmers have been acting sub optimally, the results did
not reveal that to be the case. However, it has opened up many avenues of extensions to
consider.
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SAS ® PROGRAMMING CODE FOR SIMULATED PRICES, YIELDS, REVENUES,
PREMIUMS, AND INDEMNITIES USING PQH PROCEDURE
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The appendices containing the separate parts of the programming necessary to arrive at
my results are all under the initial Illinois corn scenario. This program was used for all locations
and crops by altering the datasets used. For example, under the first PROC IMPORT statement
given on this page, the dataset designated for use here is title il_corr_irr.csv. This was used to
create the il_corr file, which is the Illinois correlation matrix used for the price and yield data
simulation. If I wanted to do Mississippi soybeans, I would pull the file that I created for
Mississippi soybeans. All that needs to be change throughout all of these codes is the state name
(i.e. il vs. ms) and the crop name (cr for corn vs. sb for soybeans). In short, this code can and
was used for every scenario given with minor changes for each location and crop.
LIBNAME disaster 'C:\Users\hdb129\Dropbox\MS Ag Econ\Thesis\Thesis\Data';
%let
%let
%let
%let
%let
%let
%let
%let

n=100000;
r_av=2;
int_w=3815;
a=0.88;
lambda=2.25;
gam=0.61;
delta=0.69;
load=1;

PROC IMPORT OUT= DISASTER.IL_CORR
DATAFILE= "C:\Users\hdb129\Dropbox\MS Ag
Econ\Thesis\Thesis\Data\Correlation Matrices\Illinois\il_corr_irr.csv"
DBMS=CSV REPLACE;
GETNAMES=YES;
DATAROW=2;
RUN;
data sim_cor; set disaster.il_corr;
PROC IMPORT OUT= DISASTER.il_corn
DATAFILE= "C:\Users\hdb129\Dropbox\MS Ag
Econ\Thesis\Thesis\Data\2017\Illinois\il_corn_mclean.xlsx"
DBMS=EXCEL REPLACE;
RANGE="il_corn_irr$";
GETNAMES=YES;
MIXED=NO;
SCANTEXT=YES;
USEDATE=YES;
SCANTIME=YES;
RUN;
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ods html close; ods html;
data sim_dat; set disaster.il_corn;
proc means data=sim_dat print mean std min max;
var c_chg c_basis c_mbasis;
output out=prc_mn mean = crz_fmn cr_bmn cr_mbmn
std = crz_fsd cr_bsd cr_mbsd
min = crz_min cr_bmin cr_mbmin
max = crz_max cr_bmax cr_mbmax;
run;
quit;
data prc_mn1; set prc_mn;
drop _TYPE_ _FREQ_;
;
run;

proc means data=sim_dat print mean std min
var crcy crfy;
output out=beta_1 mean=crcy_mn crfy_mn
std=crcy_std
min=crcy_min
max=crcy_max
run;
quit;

max;
crfy_std
crfy_min
crfy_max;

data beta_1;
drop _TYPE_ _FREQ_;
crcy_mn = 224.37;
crcy_std = 14.94;
crcy_min = 188.86;
crcy_max = 255.04;
crfy_mn = 223.72;
crfy_std = 24.89;
crfy_min = 148.16;
crfy_max = 280.94;
;
run;
quit;
data beta_2; set beta_1;
/*establishing upper and lower bounds for resids*/
ubcrc=crcy_max*1.1;
ubcrf=crfy_max*1.1;
lbcrc=crcy_min*0.9;
lbcrf=crfy_min*0.9;
run;
quit;
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data bounds; keep ubcrf lbcrf ubcrc lbcrc; set beta_2;
run;
quit;
proc iml;
use beta_2;
read all into y_mn;
/*columns = {"CCY_MN" "CCY_STD" "CCY_MIN" "CCY_MAX" "CFY_MN" "CFY_STD"
"CFY_MIN" "CFY_MAX" "UBCCY" "UBCFY" "LBCCY" "LBCFY"};
rows = {"Yield"};
print y_mn[colname = columns
rowname = rows
label = "Beta Distribution Statistics"];*/
crcy_mn=y_mn[1,1];
crfy_mn=y_mn[1,5];

use bounds;
read all into b_bounds;
/*yield = {"Yield"};
bound = {"Upper BC" "Upper BF" "Lower BC" "Lower BF"};
print b_bounds[colname = bound
rowname = yield
label = "Upper and Lower Bounds for Beta
Distribution"];*/
ubcrc=b_bounds[1,1];
ubcrf=b_bounds[1,2];
lbcrc=b_bounds[1,3];
lbcrf=b_bounds[1,4];
use sim_dat;
read all into sim1;
/*columns = {"Year" "crcy" "crfy" "c_chg" "c_basis" "c_mbasis"};
print sim1[colname = columns
label = "Illinois Corn Data"];*/
cr_cy=sim1[,2];
cr_fy=sim1[,3];
/* Begin calculation of Beta Distribution PDF following the
standard functional form for a Beta Distribution - can be
found online in the Engineering Statistics Handbook
*/
/*scaled county yield calculations*/
crcy_1=(cr_cy-lbcrc)/(ubcrc-lbcrc);
crfy_1=(cr_fy-lbcrf)/(ubcrf-lbcrf);
/*x-bar calculations*/
crcy1_mn=sum(crcy_1)/nrow(crcy_1);
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crfy1_mn=sum(crfy_1)/nrow(crfy_1);
/* var_crcy1 and var_crfy1 are the s-squared values, or variance*/
var_crcy1=sum((crcy_1-crcy1_mn)##2)/(nrow(crcy_1)-1);
var_crfy1=sum((crfy_1-crfy1_mn)##2)/(nrow(crfy_1)-1);
/* The following calculations are the the p and q parameter estimation.
p and q are the shape parameters to be used for the Beta PDF
*/
p_crcy=crcy1_mn*(((crcy1_mn*(1-crcy1_mn))/var_crcy1)-1);
q_crcy=(1-crcy1_mn)*(((crcy1_mn*(1-crcy1_mn))/(var_crcy1))-1);
p_crfy=crfy1_mn*((crfy1_mn*(1-crfy1_mn)/var_crfy1)-1);
q_crfy=(1-crfy1_mn)*(((crfy1_mn*(1-crfy1_mn))/(var_crfy1))-1);
use sim_cor;
read all into il_corr;

/***********BEGIN PQH PROCEDURE************/
/* convert rank correlation to product/moment equivalent correlations
c -> PEARSON CORRELATION */
a=3.14159265/6*il_corr;
b=sin(a);
c=2*b;
/* eigen decomposition of correlation matrix */
call eigen(eval_cor, evec_cor, c);
if eval_cor[5,1]<0 then eval_cor[5,1]=0;
n = &n;
crcy_vec=j(n, 1, crcy_mn);
crfy_vec=j(n, 1, crfy_mn);
/* square root of eigenvalues */
sq_val=sqrt(eval_cor);
/* independent random standard normal deviates
each column will represents a separate set
of correlated variables */
z=normal(repeat(0,5,n));
/* elementwise pre-multiplication of iid standard normals and eigenvalues */
z_val=z#sq_val;
/* multiplication by eigenvector matrix */
z_val_vec=evec_cor*z_val;
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/* conversion of correlated standard normals into correlated uniform(0,1) */
p=probnorm(z_val_vec);
/* transpose of probability matrix so that each row is a set of corrlated
U(0,1) variables (probabilities) */
tp=t(p);
crz_chg_p=tp[,1];
cr_cbas_p=tp[,2];
cr_mbas_p=tp[,3];
cr_cy_p=tp[,4];
cr_fy_p=tp[,5];
beg_cr=3.96;
cr_vec=j(n,1,beg_cr);
ln_beg_c=log(beg_cr);
use prc_mn1; read all into prc_dat;
cr_fmn=prc_dat[1,1];
cr_bmn=prc_dat[1,2];
cr_mbmn=prc_dat[1,3];
cr_fsd=prc_dat[1,4];
cr_bsd=prc_dat[1,5];
cr_mbsd=prc_dat[1,6];
p1_cr=probit(crz_chg_p);
fchg_cr=((p1_cr*cr_fsd)+cr_fmn);
endf_cr=beg_cr+fchg_cr;
p2_cr=probit(cr_cbas_p);
cbas_cr=((p2_cr*cr_bsd)+cr_bmn);
endc_cr=endf_cr+cbas_cr;
p3_cr=probit(cr_mbas_p);
mbas_cr=((p3_cr*cr_mbsd)+cr_mbmn);
mya_cr=endf_cr+mbas_cr;
cr_fy=(betainv(cr_fy_p,p_crfy,q_crfy)*(ubcrf-lbcrf))+lbcrf;
cr_cy=(betainv(cr_cy_p,p_crcy,q_crcy)*(ubcrc-lbcrc))+lbcrc;
cr_rev=endf_cr#cr_fy;
cr_price=endf_cr<>beg_cr;
cr50_guar=0.50#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr50_liab=0.50#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr50_diff=cr50_guar-cr_rev;
cr50_indem=0<>cr50_diff;
cr50_mnindem=mean(cr50_indem);
cr50_lc=(cr50_mnindem)/(cr50_liab);
cr50_lcvec=j(n,1,cr50_lc);
cr55_guar=0.55#crfy_mn#cr_price;
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cr55_liab=0.55#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr55_diff=cr55_guar-cr_rev;
cr55_indem=0<>cr55_diff;
cr55_mnindem=mean(cr55_indem);
cr55_lc=(cr55_mnindem)/(cr55_liab);
cr55_lcvec=j(n,1,cr55_lc);
cr60_guar=0.60#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr60_liab=0.60#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr60_diff=cr60_guar-cr_rev;
cr60_indem=0<>cr60_diff;
cr60_mnindem=mean(cr60_indem);
cr60_lc=(cr60_mnindem)/(cr60_liab);
cr60_lcvec=j(n,1,cr60_lc);
cr65_guar=0.65#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr65_liab=0.65#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr65_diff=cr65_guar-cr_rev;
cr65_indem=0<>cr65_diff;
cr65_mnindem=mean(cr65_indem);
cr65_lc=(cr65_mnindem)/(cr65_liab);
cr65_lcvec=j(n,1,cr65_lc);
cr70_guar=0.70#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr70_liab=0.70#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr70_diff=cr70_guar-cr_rev;
cr70_indem=0<>cr70_diff;
cr70_mnindem=mean(cr70_indem);
cr70_lc=(cr70_mnindem)/(cr70_liab);
cr70_lcvec=j(n,1,cr70_lc);
cr75_guar=0.75#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr75_liab=0.75#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr75_diff=cr75_guar-cr_rev;
cr75_indem=0<>cr75_diff;
cr75_mnindem=mean(cr75_indem);
cr75_lc=(cr75_mnindem)/(cr75_liab);
cr75_lcvec=j(n,1,cr75_lc);
cr80_guar=0.80#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr80_liab=0.80#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr80_diff=cr80_guar-cr_rev;
cr80_indem=0<>cr80_diff;
cr80_mnindem=mean(cr80_indem);
cr80_lc=(cr80_mnindem)/(cr80_liab);
cr80_lcvec=j(n,1,cr80_lc);
cr85_guar=0.85#crfy_mn#cr_price;
cr85_liab=0.85#crfy_mn#beg_cr;
cr85_diff=cr85_guar-cr_rev;
cr85_indem=0<>cr85_diff;
cr85_mnindem=mean(cr85_indem);
cr85_lc=(cr85_mnindem)/(cr85_liab);
cr85_lcvec=j(n,1,cr85_lc);
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simdat_il = endf_cr||endc_cr||mya_cr||
cr_fy||cr_cy||cr_vec||
crfy_vec||crcy_vec||cr_rev;
bpr_il =
cr50_lc||cr55_lc||cr60_lc||cr65_lc||cr70_lc||cr75_lc||cr80_lc||cr85_lc;
premdat_il =
cr50_lcvec||cr55_lcvec||cr60_lcvec||cr65_lcvec||cr70_lcvec||cr75_lcvec||cr80_
lcvec||cr85_lcvec;
indemdat_il1 =
cr50_indem||cr55_indem||cr60_indem||cr65_indem||cr70_indem||cr75_indem||cr80_
indem||cr85_indem;
guardat_il1 =
cr50_guar||cr55_guar||cr60_guar||cr65_guar||cr70_guar||cr75_guar||cr80_guar||
cr85_guar;
liabdat_il1 =
cr50_liab||cr55_liab||cr60_liab||cr65_liab||cr70_liab||cr75_liab||cr80_liab||
cr85_liab;
create liabdat_il1 from liabdat_il1;
append from liabdat_il1;
create guardat_il1 from guardat_il1;
append from guardat_il1;
create indemdat_il1 from indemdat_il1;
append from indemdat_il1;
create simdat_il from simdat_il;
append from simdat_il;
create premdat_il from premdat_il;
append from premdat_il;
create bpr_il from bpr_il;
append from bpr_il;
quit;
data simdat_il1;
set simdat_il;
rename col1=endf_cr
col2=endc_cr
col3=mya_cr
col4=cr_fy
col5=cr_cy
col6=begf_cr
col7=cr_aph
col8=co_ecry
col9=cr_rev;
run;
quit;
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data bpr_il;
set bpr_il;
rename col1=cr50_bpr
col2=cr55_bpr
col3=cr60_bpr
col4=cr65_bpr
col5=cr70_bpr
col6=cr75_bpr
col7=cr80_bpr
col8=cr85_bpr;
run;
quit;
data premdat_il;
set premdat_il;
rename col1=cr50_ppr
col2=cr55_ppr
col3=cr60_ppr
col4=cr65_ppr
col5=cr70_ppr
col6=cr75_ppr
col7=cr80_ppr
col8=cr85_ppr;
run;
quit;
data indemdat_il1;
set indemdat_il1;
rename col1=indem50
col2=indem55
col3=indem60
col4=indem65
col5=indem70
col6=indem75
col7=indem80
col8=indem85;
run;
quit;
data guardat_il1;
set guardat_il1;
rename col1=guar50
col2=guar55
col3=guar60
col4=guar65
col5=guar70
col6=guar75
col7=guar80
col8=guar85;
run;
quit;
data liabdat_il1;
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set liabdat_il1;
rename col1=liab50
col2=liab55
col3=liab60
col4=liab65
col5=liab70
col6=liab75
col7=liab80
col8=liab85;
run;
quit;
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data simdat_il;
merge simdat_il1 premdat_il;
/******************************** risk aversion parameters
r_av=&r_av; n = &n; int_w=3815;

********/

/*************************************** crop acres ****************/
cr_ac =1;
/************************** farm program parameters *****************/
cr_oay = 231; cr_oap = 3.56; cr_lr = 1.95; cr_base = 1; load = &load;
actrev = endf_cr*cr_fy*cr_ac;
cost = 570.00*cr_ac; /*taken from:
http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/manage/2018_crop_budgets.pdf*/
c_guar50=0.50*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab50=0.50*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c50_premsub=0.67;
prem_c50=cr_ac*c_liab50*(cr50_ppr)*(1-c50_premsub)*load;
c_guar55=0.55*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab55=0.55*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c55_premsub=0.64;
prem_c55=cr_ac*c_liab55*(cr55_ppr)*(1-c55_premsub)*load;
c_guar60=0.60*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab60=0.60*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c60_premsub=0.64;
prem_c60=cr_ac*c_liab60*(cr60_ppr)*(1-c60_premsub)*load;
c_guar65=0.65*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab65=0.65*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c65_premsub=0.59;
prem_c65=cr_ac*c_liab65*(cr65_ppr)*(1-c65_premsub)*load;
c_guar70=0.70*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab70=0.70*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c70_premsub=0.59;
prem_c70=cr_ac*c_liab70*(cr70_ppr)*(1-c70_premsub)*load;
c_guar75=0.75*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab75=0.75*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c75_premsub=0.55;
prem_c75=cr_ac*c_liab75*(cr75_ppr)*(1-c75_premsub)*load;
c_guar80=0.80*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab80=0.80*cr_aph*begf_cr;
c80_premsub=0.48;
prem_c80=cr_ac*c_liab80*(cr80_ppr)*(1-c80_premsub)*load;
c_guar85=0.85*cr_aph*max(endf_cr,begf_cr)*cr_ac;
c_liab85=0.85*cr_aph*begf_cr;
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c85_premsub=0.38;
prem_c85=cr_ac*c_liab85*(cr85_ppr)*(1-c85_premsub)*load;
/*****************RP indemnity calculations****************/
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if

c_guar50>actrev
c_guar55>actrev
c_guar60>actrev
c_guar65>actrev
c_guar70>actrev
c_guar75>actrev
c_guar80>actrev
c_guar85>actrev

all_indem50
all_indem55
all_indem60
all_indem65
all_indem70
all_indem75
all_indem80
all_indem85
all_prem50
all_prem55
all_prem60
all_prem65
all_prem70
all_prem75
all_prem80
all_prem85

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

c_indem50=c_guar50-actrev;
c_indem55=c_guar55-actrev;
c_indem60=c_guar60-actrev;
c_indem65=c_guar65-actrev;
c_indem70=c_guar70-actrev;
c_indem75=c_guar75-actrev;
c_indem80=c_guar80-actrev;
c_indem85=c_guar85-actrev;

else
else
else
else
else
else
else
else

c_indem50=0;
c_indem55=0;
c_indem60=0;
c_indem65=0;
c_indem70=0;
c_indem75=0;
c_indem80=0;
c_indem85=0;

c_indem50;
c_indem55;
c_indem60;
c_indem65;
c_indem70;
c_indem75;
c_indem80;
c_indem85;

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

net_indem50
net_indem55
net_indem60
net_indem65
net_indem70
net_indem75
net_indem80
net_indem85

then
then
then
then
then
then
then
then

prem_c50;
prem_c55;
prem_c60;
prem_c65;
prem_c70;
prem_c75;
prem_c80;
prem_c85;
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

c_indem50-prem_c50;
c_indem55-prem_c55;
c_indem60-prem_c60;
c_indem65-prem_c65;
c_indem70-prem_c70;
c_indem75-prem_c75;
c_indem80-prem_c80;
c_indem85-prem_c85;

/************ARC PAYMENTS****************/
/*A payment is made when the Actual Revenue (arc_corn_ar) is less than the
Revenue Guarantee (arc_corn_rg)*/
/*Need to calculate the Actual Revenue first*/
arc_corn_ar = cr_cy*MAX(mya_cr,cr_lr);
/*Revenue Guarantee calculation --- need Benchmark Revenue (arc_corn_br)
first for this one
Benchmark Revenue = 5-yr olympic avg yield times the 5-yr olympic avg MYA
price*/
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arc_corn_br = cr_oay*cr_oap;
arc_corn_rg = 0.86*arc_corn_br;
/*Payment Rate calculation is arc_corn_rg - arc_corn_ar, IF arc_corn_ar <
arc_corn_rg*/
if arc_corn_ar < arc_corn_rg then arc_pmt_rt = arc_corn_rg - arc_corn_ar;
else arc_pmt_rt = 0;
/*ARC payment calculation ---> arc_pmt = arc_pmt_rt*85 percent of base
acres*/
arc_pmt = arc_pmt_rt*0.85*cr_base;
rev_noprog = actrev - cost;
rev_arcprog = rev_noprog + arc_pmt;
rev_noprog50=actrev + c_indem50 - all_prem50 - cost;
rev_arcprog50=actrev + + c_indem50 - all_prem50 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog55=actrev + c_indem55 - all_prem55 - cost;
rev_arcprog55=actrev + + c_indem55 - all_prem55 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog60=actrev + c_indem60 - all_prem60 - cost;
rev_arcprog60=actrev + c_indem60 - all_prem60 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog65=actrev + c_indem65 - all_prem65 - cost;
rev_arcprog65=actrev + c_indem65 - all_prem65 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog70=actrev + c_indem70 - all_prem70 - cost;
rev_arcprog70=actrev + c_indem70 - all_prem70 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog75=actrev + c_indem75 - all_prem75 - cost;
rev_arcprog75=actrev + c_indem75 - all_prem75 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog80=actrev + c_indem80 - all_prem80 - cost;
rev_arcprog80=actrev + c_indem80 - all_prem80 + arc_pmt - cost;
rev_noprog85=actrev + c_indem85 - all_prem85 - cost;
rev_arcprog85=actrev + c_indem85 - all_prem85 + arc_pmt - cost;
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/******Utility Calculations******/
If r_av = 1 Then u_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog + int_w));
Else u_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) / (1 r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog + int_w));
Else u_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) / (1
- r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u50_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog50 + int_w));
Else u50_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog50 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u50_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog50 + int_w));
Else u50_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog50 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u55_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog55 + int_w));
Else u55_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog55 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u55_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog55 + int_w));
Else u55_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog55 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u60_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog60 + int_w));
Else u60_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog60 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u60_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog60 + int_w));
Else u60_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog60 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u65_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog65 + int_w));
Else u65_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog65 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u65_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog65 + int_w));
Else u65_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog65 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u70_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog70 + int_w));
Else u70_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog70 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u70_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog70 + int_w));
Else u70_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog70 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u75_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog75 + int_w));
Else u75_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog75 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u75_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog75 + int_w));
Else u75_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog75 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u80_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog80 + int_w));
Else u80_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog80 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u80_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog80 + int_w));
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Else u80_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog80 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u85_noprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_noprog85 + int_w));
Else u85_noprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_noprog85 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
If r_av = 1 Then u85_arcprog = (1 / n) * (Log(rev_arcprog85 + int_w));
Else u85_arcprog = (1 / n) * (((rev_arcprog85 + int_w) ** (1 - r_av)) /
(1 - r_av));
proc means data = simdat_il print mean std min max;
var net_indem50 net_indem55 net_indem60 net_indem65 net_indem70 net_indem75
net_indem80 net_indem85;
output out=avg_net_indem; title 'net indemnity calculations';
run;
quit;
proc means data = simdat_il print mean std min max;
var c_indem50 prem_c50 c_indem55 prem_c55 c_indem60 prem_c60 c_indem65
prem_c65
c_indem70 prem_c70 c_indem75 prem_c75 c_indem80 prem_c80 c_indem85
prem_c85;
output out=avg_indem_prem; title 'average indmenities and premiums';
run;
quit;
proc means data=simdat_il print sum mean std min max;
var u_noprog u_arcprog u50_noprog u50_arcprog u55_noprog u55_arcprog
u60_noprog u60_arcprog u65_noprog u65_arcprog
u70_noprog u70_arcprog u75_noprog u75_arcprog u80_noprog u80_arcprog
u85_noprog u85_arcprog;
output out=util_comp sum=usum00_np usum00_ap usum50_np usum50_ap usum55_np
usum55_ap usum60_np usum60_ap usum65_np usum65_ap
usum70_np usum70_ap usum75_np usum75_ap
usum80_np usum80_ap usum85_np usum85_ap; title 'utility comps';
proc means data = simdat_il print mean std min max;
var rev_noprog rev_noprog50 rev_noprog55 rev_noprog60 rev_noprog65
rev_noprog70 rev_noprog75 rev_noprog80 rev_noprog85;
output out = rev_rp_means; title 'Descriptive Stats RP Crop Insurance Only';
run;
quit;
proc means data = simdat_il print mean std min max;
var arc_pmt rev_arcprog rev_arcprog50 rev_arcprog55 rev_arcprog60
rev_arcprog65 rev_arcprog70 rev_arcprog75 rev_arcprog80 rev_arcprog85;
output out = rev_arc_means; title 'Descriptive Stats for ARC and RP Crop
Insurance';
run;
quit;
data desc_stats_ilcorn;
merge avg_net_indem avg_indem_prem util_comp rev_rp_means rev_arc_means;
drop _TYPE_ _FREQ_;
run;
quit;
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/*%mend skip;*/
/******Certainty Equivalent Calculations******/
data ce_comp; set util_comp;
r_av=&r_av; int_w=&int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then
Else ce_np
If r_av = 1 Then
Else ce_ap

ce_np = (Exp(usum00_np)) - int_w;
= ((usum00_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
ce_ap = (Exp(usum00_ap)) - int_w;
= ((usum00_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;

If r_av = 1 Then ce50_np = (Exp(usum50_np)) - int_w;
Else ce50_np = ((usum50_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce50_ap = (Exp(usum50_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce50_ap = ((usum50_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce55_np = (Exp(usum55_np)) - int_w;
Else ce55_np = ((usum55_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce55_ap = (Exp(usum55_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce55_ap = ((usum55_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce60_np = (Exp(usum60_np)) - int_w;
Else ce60_np = ((usum60_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce60_ap = (Exp(usum60_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce60_ap = ((usum60_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce65_np = (Exp(usum65_np)) - int_w;
Else ce65_np = ((usum65_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce65_ap = (Exp(usum65_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce65_ap = ((usum65_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce70_np = (Exp(usum70_np)) - int_w;
Else ce70_np = ((usum70_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce70_ap = (Exp(usum70_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce70_ap = ((usum70_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce75_np = (Exp(usum75_np)) - int_w;
Else ce75_np = ((usum75_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce75_ap = (Exp(usum75_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce75_ap = ((usum75_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce80_np = (Exp(usum80_np)) - int_w;
Else ce80_np = ((usum80_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce80_ap = (Exp(usum80_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce80_ap = ((usum80_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce85_np = (Exp(usum85_np)) - int_w;
Else ce85_np = ((usum85_np * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
If r_av = 1 Then ce85_ap = (Exp(usum85_ap)) - int_w;
Else ce85_ap = ((usum85_ap * (1 - r_av)) ** (1 / (1 - r_av))) - int_w;
run;
quit;
/*proc print data = simdat_il; title 'raw data';
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run;
quit;*/
data indemdat_il2;
set simdat_il;
keep c_indem50 c_indem55 c_indem60 c_indem65 c_indem70 c_indem75 c_indem80
c_indem85;
run;
quit;
data guardat_il2;
set simdat_il;
keep c_guar50 c_guar55 c_guar60 c_guar65 c_guar70 c_guar75 c_guar80 c_guar85;
data liabdat_il2;
set simdat_il;
keep c_liab50 c_liab55 c_liab60 c_liab65 c_liab70 c_liab75 c_liab80 c_liab85;
data ce_out; set ce_comp;
drop _TYPE_ _FREQ_;
proc print data=ce_out;
var usum00_np usum50_np usum55_np usum60_np usum65_np usum70_np usum75_np
usum80_np usum85_np;
title 'Utilities - RP w/no arc payment';
run;
quit;
proc print data=ce_out;
var usum00_ap usum50_ap usum55_ap usum60_ap usum65_ap usum70_ap usum75_ap
usum80_ap usum85_ap;
title 'Utilities - RP w/arc payment';
run;
quit;
proc print data=ce_out;
var ce_np ce50_np ce55_np ce60_np ce65_np ce70_np ce75_np ce80_np ce85_np;
title 'CE - RP w/no arc payment';
run;
quit;
proc print data=ce_out;
var ce_ap ce50_ap ce55_ap ce60_ap ce65_ap ce70_ap ce75_ap ce80_ap ce85_ap ;
title 'CE - RP w/arc payment';
run;
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proc means data=simdat_il mean noprint;
var rev_noprog prem_c50 prem_c55 prem_c60 prem_c65 prem_c70 prem_c75 prem_c80
prem_c85 arc_pmt;
output out=refmean mean=;
run;
data refmean;
set refmean;
ref0_1=rev_noprog;
ref1_1=rev_noprog;
ref1_2=rev_noprog;
ref1_3=rev_noprog;
ref1_4=rev_noprog;
ref1_5=rev_noprog;
ref1_6=rev_noprog;
ref1_7=rev_noprog;
ref1_8=rev_noprog;
ref2_1=rev_noprog+prem_c50;
ref2_2=rev_noprog+prem_c55;
ref2_3=rev_noprog+prem_c60;
ref2_4=rev_noprog+prem_c65;
ref2_5=rev_noprog+prem_c70;
ref2_6=rev_noprog+prem_c75;
ref2_7=rev_noprog+prem_c80;
ref2_8=rev_noprog+prem_c85;
ref3_1=prem_c50;
ref3_2=prem_c55;
ref3_3=prem_c60;
ref3_4=prem_c65;
ref3_5=prem_c70;
ref3_6=prem_c75;
ref3_7=prem_c80;
ref3_8=prem_c85;
ref4_1=rev_noprog+arc_pmt;
ref5_1=arc_pmt;
ref6_1=rev_noprog+prem_c50+arc_pmt;
ref6_2=rev_noprog+prem_c55+arc_pmt;
ref6_3=rev_noprog+prem_c60+arc_pmt;
ref6_4=rev_noprog+prem_c65+arc_pmt;
ref6_5=rev_noprog+prem_c70+arc_pmt;
ref6_6=rev_noprog+prem_c75+arc_pmt;
ref6_7=rev_noprog+prem_c80+arc_pmt;
ref6_8=rev_noprog+prem_c85+arc_pmt;
call symput('ref0_1',trim(left(put(ref0_1,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_1',trim(left(put(ref1_1,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_2',trim(left(put(ref1_2,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_3',trim(left(put(ref1_3,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_4',trim(left(put(ref1_4,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_5',trim(left(put(ref1_5,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_6',trim(left(put(ref1_6,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_7',trim(left(put(ref1_7,12.6))));
call symput('ref1_8',trim(left(put(ref1_8,12.6))));
call symput('ref2_1',trim(left(put(ref2_1,12.6))));
call symput('ref2_2',trim(left(put(ref2_2,12.6))));
call symput('ref2_3',trim(left(put(ref2_3,12.6))));
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call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
call
run;

symput('ref2_4',trim(left(put(ref2_4,12.6))));
symput('ref2_5',trim(left(put(ref2_5,12.6))));
symput('ref2_6',trim(left(put(ref2_6,12.6))));
symput('ref2_7',trim(left(put(ref2_7,12.6))));
symput('ref2_8',trim(left(put(ref2_8,12.6))));
symput('ref3_1',trim(left(put(ref3_1,12.6))));
symput('ref3_2',trim(left(put(ref3_2,12.6))));
symput('ref3_3',trim(left(put(ref3_3,12.6))));
symput('ref3_4',trim(left(put(ref3_4,12.6))));
symput('ref3_5',trim(left(put(ref3_5,12.6))));
symput('ref3_6',trim(left(put(ref3_6,12.6))));
symput('ref3_7',trim(left(put(ref3_7,12.6))));
symput('ref3_8',trim(left(put(ref3_8,12.6))));
symput('ref4_1',trim(left(put(ref4_1,12.6))));
symput('ref5_1',trim(left(put(ref5_1,12.6))));
symput('ref6_1',trim(left(put(ref6_1,12.6))));
symput('ref6_2',trim(left(put(ref6_2,12.6))));
symput('ref6_3',trim(left(put(ref6_3,12.6))));
symput('ref6_4',trim(left(put(ref6_4,12.6))));
symput('ref6_5',trim(left(put(ref6_5,12.6))));
symput('ref6_6',trim(left(put(ref6_6,12.6))));
symput('ref6_7',trim(left(put(ref6_7,12.6))));
symput('ref6_8',trim(left(put(ref6_8,12.6))));

/******HISTOGRAM OF REVENUE DISTRIBUTIONS******/
data revdist_il;
set simdat_il;
keep rev_noprog rev_noprog50 rev_noprog55 rev_noprog60 rev_noprog65
rev_noprog70 rev_noprog75 rev_noprog80 rev_noprog85
rev_arcprog rev_arcprog50 rev_arcprog55 rev_arcprog60 rev_arcprog65
rev_arcprog70 rev_arcprog75 rev_arcprog80 rev_arcprog85
c_indem50 c_indem55 c_indem60 c_indem65 c_indem70 c_indem75 c_indem80
c_indem85 arc_pmt
act0_1 act1_1 act1_2 act1_3 act1_4 act1_5 act1_6 act1_7 act1_8 act2_1
act2_2 act2_3 act2_4 act2_5 act2_6 act2_7 act2_8
act3_1 act3_2 act3_3 act3_4 act3_5 act3_6 act3_7 act3_8 act4_1 act5_1
act6_1 act6_2 act6_3 act6_4 act6_5 act6_6 act6_7 act6_8;
act0_1=rev_noprog;
act1_1=rev_noprog+c_indem50;
act1_2=rev_noprog+c_indem55;
act1_3=rev_noprog+c_indem60;
act1_4=rev_noprog+c_indem65;
act1_5=rev_noprog+c_indem70;
act1_6=rev_noprog+c_indem75;
act1_7=rev_noprog+c_indem80;
act1_8=rev_noprog+c_indem85;
act2_1=rev_noprog+c_indem50;
act2_2=rev_noprog+c_indem55;
act2_3=rev_noprog+c_indem60;
act2_4=rev_noprog+c_indem65;
act2_5=rev_noprog+c_indem70;
act2_6=rev_noprog+c_indem75;
act2_7=rev_noprog+c_indem80;
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act2_8=rev_noprog+c_indem85;
act3_1=c_indem50;
act3_2=c_indem55;
act3_3=c_indem60;
act3_4=c_indem65;
act3_5=c_indem70;
act3_6=c_indem75;
act3_7=c_indem80;
act3_8=c_indem85;
act4_1=rev_noprog+arc_pmt;
act5_1=arc_pmt;
act6_1=rev_noprog+c_indem50+arc_pmt;
act6_2=rev_noprog+c_indem55+arc_pmt;
act6_3=rev_noprog+c_indem60+arc_pmt;
act6_4=rev_noprog+c_indem65+arc_pmt;
act6_5=rev_noprog+c_indem70+arc_pmt;
act6_6=rev_noprog+c_indem75+arc_pmt;
act6_7=rev_noprog+c_indem80+arc_pmt;
act6_8=rev_noprog+c_indem85+arc_pmt;
run;
quit;
*ods html close; *ods html;
*ods trace on;
/******END HISTOGRAM CODE******/
*ods graphics off;
*ods graphics on;
%macro pt(cdf_var, act, ref);
ods output ParameterEstimates=p_est GoodnessOfFit=FitStats;
proc univariate data = revdist_il normal;
*var rev_noprog;
var &cdf_var;
histogram / gamma(theta = est) normal outhist=pdf_est;
*cdf rev_noprog / gamma;
*cdf &cdf_var / gamma;
run;
quit;
data p_est;
set p_est;
if (distribution="Normal" and symbol="Mu
") then do;
normal_mu=estimate;
call symput('normal_mu',trim(left(put(estimate,12.8))));
end;
if (distribution="Normal" and symbol="Sigma ") then do;
normal_var=estimate;
call symput('normal_var',trim(left(put(estimate,12.8))));
end;
if (distribution="Gamma " and symbol="Alpha ") then do;
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gamma_alpha=estimate;
call symput('gamma_alpha',trim(left(put(estimate,12.8))));
end;
if (distribution="Gamma " and symbol="Sigma ") then do;
gamma_sigma=estimate;
call symput('gamma_sigma',trim(left(put(estimate,12.8))));
end;
if (distribution="Gamma " and symbol="Theta ") then do;
gamma_theta=estimate;
call symput('gamma_theta',trim(left(put(estimate,12.8))));
end;
run;
data p_est1;
set p_est;
normal_mu=&normal_mu;
normal_var=&normal_var;
gamma_alpha=&gamma_alpha;
gamma_sigma=&gamma_sigma;
gamma_theta=&gamma_theta;
run;
data n p np(keep=ncount pcount);
set revdist_il;
*if rev_noprog < 872.86658884 then do;
if &act < &ref then do;
output n;
ncount+1;
end;
else output p;
if _n_=&n then do;
pcount=&n-ncount;
output np;
call symput('ncount',trim(left(put(ncount,12.8))));
call symput('pcount',trim(left(put(pcount,12.8))));
end;
run;
proc sort data=p;
by &cdf_var;
run;
data p;
set p;
cdf=cdf('GAMMA',&act,&gamma_alpha,&gamma_sigma);
*cdf=cdf('GAMMA',rev_noprog,&gamma_alpha,&gamma_sigma);
*cdfn=cdf('NORMAL',rev_noprog,&normal_mu,&normal_var);
run;
data p1;
set p;
cdf_1=cdf;
keep cdf_1;
if _n_=1 then delete;
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run;
data p;
merge p p1;
if cdf_1=. then cdf_1=1;
run;
data p;
set p;
xi=&act-&ref;
a=&a;
gam=&gam;
*Babcock's way
pi_p=(&pcount-_n_+1)/&n;
pi_p_1=(&pcount-_n_)/&n;
w_p=(pi_p**gam)/(((pi_p**gam)+(1-pi_p)**gam)**(1/gam));
w_p_1=(pi_p_1**gam)/(((pi_p_1**gam)+(1-pi_p_1)**gam)**(1/gam));
dec_wt_p=w_p-w_p_1;
vi_p = xi**a;
big_vi_p=(dec_wt_p)*vi_p;
run;
proc sort data=n;
by descending &cdf_var;
run;
data n;
set n;
cdf=cdf('GAMMA',&act,&gamma_alpha,&gamma_sigma);
*cdfn=cdf('NORMAL',rev_noprog,&normal_mu,&normal_var);
run;
data n1;
set n;
cdf_1=cdf;
keep cdf_1;
if _n_=1 then delete;
run;
data n;
merge n n1;
if cdf_1=. then cdf_1=0;
run;
data n;
set n;
xi=&act-&ref;
a=&a;
lambda=&lambda;
delta=&delta;
*Babcock's way
pi_n=(&ncount-_n_+1)/&n;
pi_n_1=(&ncount-_n_)/&n;
w_n=(pi_n**delta)/(((pi_n**delta)+(1-pi_n)**delta)**(1/delta));
w_n_1=(pi_n_1**delta)/(((pi_n_1**delta)+(1-pi_n_1)**delta)**(1/delta));
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dec_wt_n = w_n-w_n_1;
vi_n = -lambda*((-xi)**a);
big_vi_n=(dec_wt_n)*vi_n;
run;
proc means data=p sum noprint;
var big_vi_p big_vi_p_o;
output out=pos sum=;
run;
proc means data=n sum noprint;
var big_vi_n big_vi_n_o;
output out=neg sum=;
run;
data w;
merge p n;
run;
proc plot data=w nomiss;
plot w_p*pi_p='*'
w_n*pi_n='o'
pi_p*pi_p='#'
pi_n*pi_n='^' / overlay box;
title 'Probability Weighting Functions';
run;
proc plot data=w nomiss;
plot dec_wt_p*pi_p='*'
dec_wt_n*pi_n='o'
title 'Decision Weights';
run;

/ overlay box;

data comb;
merge a pos neg;
vi_b=big_vi_p + big_vi_n;
vi_o=big_vi_p_o+big_vi_n_o;
drop _type_ _freq_;
run;
proc append base=finalresults data=comb force;
run;
%mend pt;
data names;
input name $6.0;
datalines;
ref0_1
ref1_1
ref1_2
ref1_3
ref1_4
ref1_5
ref1_6
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ref1_7
ref1_8
ref2_1
ref2_2
ref2_3
ref2_4
ref2_5
ref2_6
ref2_7
ref2_8
ref3_1
ref3_2
ref3_3
ref3_4
ref3_5
ref3_6
ref3_7
ref3_8
ref4_1
ref5_1
ref6_1
ref6_2
ref6_3
ref6_4
ref6_5
ref6_6
ref6_7
ref6_8
;
run;
%macro call;
%do i = 1 %to 35;
data a;
set names;
if _n_ = &i;
call symput('name',trim(left(put(name,$6.0))));
run;
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if

&i=1
&i=2
&i=3
&i=4
&i=5
&i=6
&i=7
&i=8
&i=9
&i=10
&i=11
&i=12
&i=13
&i=14

%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then

%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,
%pt(rev_noprog,

act0_1,
act1_1,
act1_2,
act1_3,
act1_4,
act1_5,
act1_6,
act1_7,
act1_8,
act2_1,
act2_2,
act2_3,
act2_4,
act2_5,
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&ref0_1);
&ref1_1);
&ref1_2);
&ref1_3);
&ref1_4);
&ref1_5);
&ref1_6);
&ref1_7);
&ref1_8);
&ref2_1);
&ref2_2);
&ref2_3);
&ref2_4);
&ref2_5);

%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else
%else

%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if
%if

&i=15
&i=16
&i=17
&i=18
&i=19
&i=20
&i=21
&i=22
&i=23
&i=24
&i=25
&i=26
&i=27
&i=28
&i=29
&i=30
&i=31
&i=32
&i=33
&i=34

%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then
%then

%pt(rev_noprog, act2_6,
%pt(rev_noprog, act2_7,
%pt(rev_noprog, act2_8,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_1,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_2,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_3,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_4,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_5,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_6,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_7,
%pt(rev_noprog, act3_8,
%pt(rev_noprog, act4_1,
%pt(rev_noprog, act5_1,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_1,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_2,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_3,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_4,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_5,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_6,
%pt(rev_noprog, act6_7,
%pt(rev_noprog,

%end;
%mend call;
%call;
quit;
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&ref2_6); %else
&ref2_7); %else
&ref2_8); %else
&ref3_1); %else
&ref3_2); %else
&ref3_3); %else
&ref3_4); %else
&ref3_5); %else
&ref3_6); %else
&ref3_7); %else
&ref3_8); %else
&ref4_1); %else
&ref5_1); %else
&ref6_1); %else
&ref6_2); %else
&ref6_3); %else
&ref6_4); %else
&ref6_5); %else
&ref6_6); %else
&ref6_7); %else
act6_8, &ref6_8);

